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Editor’s Note
This issue of Space & Defense continues
our effort to apply analytical tools from the field
of political economy to emergent questions of
defense policy. Many of the decision points relate
to earth orbit as befits our heritage. Others
expand the definition of space to include frontiers
of conflict where new technology or novel actors
present unresolved challenges for the United
States and allied national security establishments.
We believe contributions for this issue on
Russia’s space sector; a prospective asteroid
mining enterprise; criminalized power structures
in fragile states; hypersonic weapons
development; and the physics of financial markets
are diverse manifestations of a single ethos. What
unites them is our educated hunch that national
security competition in new spaces will involve
mixed actors—states, international organizations,
sub-state agencies, and non-state entities; mixed
motives encompassing geopolitical rivalry and
global public goods attained through cooperation;
and mixed domains as competitors bring assets to
bear across land, sea, air, space, and cyber.
Dealing with this complexity, many of our
analyses in Space & Defense run across four
geopolitical chessboards—trade, finance, global
security, and science & technology—reflecting
late British political economist Susan Strange’s
four structures of power. Insightful contributions
for our journal probe the multidimensional
international security environment for patterns of
political behavior that tie action and consequences
across these chessboards. Doing so in coherent
ways helps policy makers tackle problems of
deterrence and international organization for the
21st century at the frontiers of defense policy. It
also fulfills the charter of the U.S. Air force
Academy’s Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies, which posits an inherent
connection between strengthening intellectual
foundations of the space policy community and
fostering learning across communities—within the
U.S. Government and beyond—interested in
achieving a world more peaceful, prosperous, and
just.

Our journal applauds several organizations within
the U.S. Department of Defense that are acting
upon a similar hunch about security challenges in
new spaces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) among others
are expanding their communities of interest (COI),
initiating strategic multi-layer assessments (SMA),
and in general finding creative ways to bridge the
gap, a pernicious vacuum separating their policy
responsibilities from historical scholarship and
social science research.
Space & Defense, consistent with the goals of the
Eisenhower Center, encourages participants in
these burgeoning transnational communities of
interest to try their hand at one or more of the
important questions generated by these processes.
This particular set of problems is growing as it
becomes more refined, right at the nexus of
policy-relevant scholarship.

`

Damon Coletta
USAFA
June 2017

Senior Leader Essay

The Russian Space Sector:
Adaptation, Retrenchment, and Stagnation
Bruce McClintock
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia focused on its public space sector and consciously chose not
to cultivate competitive, private space companies. Russia’s overall space enterprise is now in systemic
crisis due to multiple factors and, despite positive rhetoric from the government and with the partial
exception of national security space capabilities, faces yet another generation of stagnation.
On October 4, 1957 the Soviet Union
launched the first satellite into orbit from a site
now known as Baikonur Cosmodrome.1 The
Sputnik surprise launched the Space Race and
ushered in an era of rapid advancement in
technological and scientific developments. Much
has changed for both Russia and the United States
in the last sixty years. On March 30, 2017 a
private U.S. company successfully launched a
commercial satellite into orbit with a previously
used first stage booster—a feat never before
accomplished and one that may launch a cheaper
era of space travel.2 The same day in Russia, an
investigation into quality control issues in the
Russian space industry reported that nearly every
engine currently stockpiled for use in Russian
Proton rockets is defective.3 This investigation
followed a catastrophic year for Russian space
launch. In December 2016 a Russian Progress
resupply craft burned up in the Earth’s
atmosphere shortly after liftoff from Baikonur, the
1

Brig Gen (ret) Bruce McClintock is the CEO of
Zenith Advisors Group and an adjunct policy analyst at
the RAND Corporation. Prior to retiring, he was
special assistant to the commander of AF Space
Command. Until July 2016 he was the Senior Defense
Official and U.S. Defense Attaché in the U.S. Embassy
in Moscow, Russia.
2
Kenneth Chang, “SpaceX Launches a Satellite with a
Partly Used Rocket,” New York Times, 30 March 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/science/spacexlaunches-a-satellite-with-a-partly-usedrocket.html?emc=edit_nn_20170331&nl=morningbriefing&nlid=70171243&te=1.
3
Matthew Bodner, “Defects Found in Almost Every
Russian Proton Rocket Engine,” Moscow Times, 30
March 2017,
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/defects-found-inalmost-every-russian-proton-rocket-engine-57584.

twentieth malfunction of a Russian launcher since
2001, marking an inauspicious end to what many
describe as a make-or-break year for Russian
commercial space. Another potential indicator of
the crisis in the Russian space sector is that last
year Russia fell behind the United States and
China in the number of space launches. Russia
finished 2016 with just 18 launches, compared to
China's 19 and America's 20 launches.4
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union presented new opportunites for
Russia to reinvent its government and economy,
including its remarkable Soviet-era space program.
The journey of the Russian space industry since
the collapse of the Soviet Union offers a case
study in how Russia, in spite of indications to do
otherwise, chose not to break with previous
models of behavior and organization. In addition,
the history indicates that, without a significant
change in direction, the Russian space industry
likely faces more stagnation and even further
decline.
EARLY OPTIMISM AND PUBLIC SPACE
SUCCESSES
While the picture looks less positive now,
in the early 1990s there was plenty of optimism
and cooperation between Russia and the West that
looked likely to benefit the Russian space sector.
President Clinton reflected the optimism of the
4

Matthew Bodner, “Russia Falls Behind the U.S. and
China in Annual Space Launches,” Moscow Times, 29
November 2016,
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-fallsbehind-us-and-china-in-annual-space-launches-forfirst-time-ever-56344.
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time in his remarks at the U.S. Naval Academy
graduation in 1993: “President Yeltsin and his
fellow reformers throughout Russia are
courageously leading three modern Russian
revolutions, to transform their country from a
totalitarian state into a democracy; from a
command economy into a market; and from an
empire into a modern nation-state.” Budget
constraints, system failures (such as the
Challenger disaster in 1986) and a desire to
continue human space exploration futher
motivated the United States to assist with Russian
integration into the space enterprise supply chain.
The signing of a bilateral trade liberalization
treaty on commercial satellite launch services did
pave the way for “public-public (International
Space Station), public-private (NASA and
Russian Space Agency subcontracting)
cooperation, and for major private joint ventures
between U.S. and Russian firms in the aerospace
sector.”5
This cooperation was most apparent in the publicpublic sector. Russia and the United States agreed
to place U.S. astronauts on the Mir space station
and Russian cosmonauts on the U.S. shuttle. Both
countries agreed to an ambitious International
Space Station (ISS) plan that made Russia a major
partner. The Russian Space Agency also agreed
to provide resupply for the ISS using Soyuzlaunched Progress cargo vehicles and crew
transportation to and from the station. 6 The
zenith of the public-public cooperation for Russia
was the eventual exclusive use of Soyuz to
resupply and staff the ISS following the second
shuttle accident in 2002. Overall, the Soyuz
System has been remarkably successful over its
lifetime.
Russia also had its own internal public sector
space successes, independent of the international
5

Jeffrey Pigman, “The New Aerospace Diplomacy:
Reconstructing Post-Cold War U.S.-Russian Economic
Relations,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 15(4), 2004, pp.
683–723.
6
NASA, the other ISS partners, and the RSA agreed to
incorporate major Russian contributions to the new
space station totaling one third of the mass of the
completed station and almost half of the volume of the
station’s pressurized area (Pigman 2004: 703).

4

community. GLONASS, Russia’s Global
Navigation Satellite System, is fully operational
and an accepted international system for
navigation and timing. This system, originally
designed for use by the Russian Aerospace Forces,
has grown in popularity as a commercial system
for public use, due in no small part to guidance
from President Putin. There are other examples,
including the Public-Private Partnership between
Gazprom Space Systems and Roscosmos. This
operator has its own communications satellite
constellation, providing services to both
institutional and private players.7
SIMILAR OPTIMISM FOR RUSSIAN
PRIVATIZATION AND
COMMERCIALIZATION, DIFFERENT
RESULTS
The end of the Cold War accelerated an
overall shift in U.S. space policy—inspiring the
commercialization of space and encouraging the
private sector to take on as much space
development work as was commercially feasible.8
From a U.S. perspective, many assumed that the
combination of bilateral agreements and publicpublic cooperation would pave the way for similar
commercialization in the Russian space industry.
In fact, Russia never truly intended to
commercialize its industry. Russia’s true intent
was to make its space sector more competitive
while retaining government control.9
Both United States and Russian firms had to
adjust their business models from primarily
defense work to accommodate commercial work.
However, Russian firms faced challenges that U.S.
firms did not. Most importantly, Russian firms all
came from a Soviet model that centralized control
7

Email exchange with Ivan Kosenkov, 5 December
2016.
8
Pigman 2004: 700, 706. National Space Policy
Directive 2, issued in September 1990, actively
promoted creation of an international marketplace in
commercial space launch services, while still
maintaining heavy Cold War-era restrictions on
technology transfer and limiting U.S. Government
satellite launches to U.S.-built launch vehicles.
9
Ivan Kosenkov, “Re: Questions regarding your
article,” received by Bruce McClintock, 5 December
2016.
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of decision-making and resource distribution.
Russian firms, whether fully or partially
privatized on paper, still had to develop their
functional autonomy as enterprises. This legacy
meant that, while Russian companies did gain
market share and formed joint ventures with
others in the United States and elsewhere, their
companies still behaved like state-run entities.
Arguably, this behavior was conscious and not a
failure on the part of the companies to adapt to
Western models.
For example, International Launch Services (ILS),
formed in 1995 as a joint venture between
Lockheed, Khrunichev and Energia, is today a
subsidiary of Roscosmos, the State Corporation
for Space. So, while Lockheed and Boeing
currently operate United Launch Alliance as a
truly private entity operating Atlas launchers, ILS
operates Proton launchers as a state-owned
monopoly in Russia. Sea Launch provided
another well-known example of integration
between Boeing, the Russian firm RSC Energia
and others.
Other joint ventures occurred at the component
level. The most well-known is the Lockheed
Martin selection of an Energomash RD-180 for
use as a booster on the Atlas V. In 2000 the RD180 became the first Russian-designed and built
propulsion system on a U.S.-designed launch
vehicle. The RD-180 remains in use by customers,
including the United States even though
Energomash is also largely owned by the Russian
government.
In general, Russian firms used joint ventures to
gain market share without truly privatizing their
companies. While not apparent to the West
twenty-five years ago, it now seems clear that the
Russian government never intended to privatize
their industry in the same way the West did.
FACTORS LEADING TO OVERALL
DECLINE OF RUSSIA’S SPACE INDUSTRY
In the post-WWII Soviet era, the space
sector attracted the best and brightest of Russian
talent and significant infrastructure investment.
Conversely, severe government funding shortages
in the 1990s created early and long-lasting

impacts to the Russian space sector.10 The lack of
funding caused degradation to national
constellations, infrastructure, and personnel.
Observers visiting Russian rocket facilities in the
1990s reported design, manufacturing, and test
facilities in a state of decay. Possibly more telling
was the lack of a cadre of young professionals and
middle managers ready to take the place of the
early Soviet space leaders.11
The immediate impact of the reduced funding was
delays in accomplishing new projects. For
example, the Russian strategy from the 1990s
envisioned a Proton replacement, called Angara,
which should have already been fielded. As one
analyst put it, “like many things in Russia’s
history, the Angara’s path toward the market has
not been straightforward or easy.” In 2014, the
Angara did have two successful test launches but
is still years away from replacing the Proton.12
Existing system reliability is also faltering over
time. Since 2001, Russia has had anomalies on
twelve Proton and eight Soyuz launches, the most
recent being the loss of a Progress resupply
mission on December 1st, 2016. Some of the
launch failures have been directly attributed to
quality control lapses. For example, in 2009, a
communications satellite was placed in incorrect
orbit due to a mission software error. In 2010, a
Proton rocket failed because it was loaded with
too much propellant. In 2013, another Proton
crashed because it had flight control sensors
installed upside-down.13
Besides the shock of the lack of funding in the
1990s, the troubling trend of reduced reliability
and slow progress on new projects is routinely
attributed to several factors.
Brain Drain—Russia’s space specialist population
is aging, and their competence is waning due to
10

Ibid.
Jim Marshall, “Questions on Space and Russia,”
received by Bruce McClintock, 5 December 2016.
12
Anatoly Zak, “Getting Its Space Mojo Back,”
aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org, November 2016,
https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/features/getting-itsspace-mojo-back/.
13
Zak 2016.
11
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the low attractiveness of space careers. This is
due in part to reportedly low pay in the space
sector. Also, some claim that, to comply with the
Russian state secrets law, space workers are not
allowed to travel outside of Russia—a big
disincentive for young Russians.
Corruption—Generally considered organic to the
Russian economic system, corruption has become
evident over the last few years in various aspects
of the space sector. The most famous example of
corruption is the construction of the Vostochny
Space Launch center. Russians envisioned
Vostochny in the 1990s as a replacement for the
Russian reliance on Baikonur. Over the last few
years there have been numerous public delays
associated with the construction of the launch
facility and several cases of managers and
workers arrested for corruption. Separately, in
January 2017, Roscosmos announced it was
withdrawing all second and third-stage engines for
the Proton-M rocket, citing "technical reasons."
At the same time, Russian media reported that
factory bosses manufacturing engines for Russia's
Proton-M rocket may have swapped precious
metals for cheaper alternatives, possibly leading
to the failure of the Proton in December 2016.14
Elsewhere, there are reports of substantial
percentages of state budgets siphoned from major
programs and projects as a part of “overhead.”
Reduced Budgets—While Russia has improved
upon its desultory budgets from the 1990s, this
decade it had to reduce government funding for
space. As recently as 2014, Russia promised $70
billion for a ten-year space program. In 2016,
struggling economically due to reduced oil prices
and international sanctions, the government
approved only $20.5 billion.15 Not only does
reduced funding reduce or delay marquee projects
such as lunar exploration; reduced funding further
14

“Russian Police Investigate Alleged Substitution
Scam at Rocket Engine Factory,” Moscow Times, 25
January 2017,
https://themoscowtimes.com/news/experts-checkrussian-rocket-engines-for-low-quality-metal-56918.
15
Matthew Bodner, “Grounded: Economic Crisis
Hobbles Russian Space Program,” Moscow Times, 24
March 2016,
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/groundedeconomic-crisis-hobbles-russian-space-program-52257.
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contributes to decay of the space infrastructure.16
Indeed, the Russian government publicly
acknowledged the crisis in the space industry and
has taken actions in an attempt to reverse the slide,
not all of them helpful.17
Multiple Reorganizations—Russia attempted
several variations on organizational models for the
space industry. Between 2012 and 2015, Russia
formed United Rocket and Space Corporation,
using leaders from the Russian automobile
industry. URSC was granted property rights over
space enterprise assets and separated from the
state space agency. Uncertainty about
responsibility sharing and control, accompanied
by additional delays, cancellations, and hardware
failures, led to another reorganization in 2015.
Effective January 1, 2016, Russia made
Roscosmos a state corporation rather than a
government agency. This is a return to the
previous model—all space industry united in one
framework—making the policy and procurement
decisions. Roscosmos is now responsible for
oversight and business development of most key
organizations in the Russian aerospace industry,
including Energia, Khrunichev, and Energomash.
The Kremlin’s stated goal at the time was to make
the industry more competitive and profit oriented.
Most observers agree that in practice there has
been little change in management and
organization of such core programs as the Soyuz,
Progress, and International Space Station.
Master Plans—Russia’s latest Federal Space
Program for 2016-2025 (FKP 2025) illuminates
the long-term crisis faced by the Russian space
16

In 2016, for example, Igor Komarov, the head of
Roscosmos, publicly noted a “considerable lag in the
use of modern development methods, low productivity,
and worn machinery” (Zak 2016).
17
In March 2016, the Roscosomos communications
director said, “It’s no secret that the reforms that are
underway now might not have occurred if the state had
not acknowledged that the Russian space industry is in
a systemic crisis.” Shura Collinson, “Experts Look to
Space X Phenomenon in Quest to Develop Russia’s
Private Space Industry.” 4 March 2016,
http://sk.ru/news/b/articles/archive/2016/03/04/expertslook-to-spacex-phenomenon-in-quest-to-developrussia_1920_s-private-space-industry.aspx, accessed
December 1, 2016.
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sector since it is the latest plan that promises
progress but ultimately decreases the scope of
effort. FKP 2025 effectively prioritizes
preservation of Russia’s existing satellite
constellation, consolidation and streamlining of
the decaying space industry, and minimizing
delays in the Russian program for lunar
exploration.18
Leadership Changes and Reprimands—The
current head of Roscosmos, Igor Komarov, is the
fourth Russian space agency director since 2009.19
More recently, following the 24-hour delay of the
inaugural launch from Vostochny, President Putin
officially reprimanded Deputy Prime Minister
Rogozin, Roscosmos head Komarov, and the head
of the manufacturing firm responsible for the
problematic component. Leadership changes have
done little to improve the current situation.
SKOLKOVO: RECENT EFFORTS TO
ENCOURAGE SPACE COMPANIES WITH
SPORADIC RESULTS
One effort that has shown some signs of
promise for helping form a true private Russian
space sector is the Skolkovo initiative. In 2010,
Russian President Medvedev launched the
Skolkovo Innovation Center, which included a
Space and Telecommunications “cluster” among
the five core clusters. There is some sign of hope
for the private sector via the Skolkovo cluster. As
of October 2016, there were more than 180
participants at Skolkovo in various technological
domains related to space activities.20 Skolkovo
allows these participants to find investment,
18

There is still some progress on the lunar base plan
but at a much lower level. For example, NPO
Lavochkin intends to launch one lunar probe every
year or two for the next seven years. There are also
successes such as the Radioastron mission and
preparation of next space observatories—Spektr RG
and Millimetron. Kosenkov email, 5 December 2016.
19
Marcia Smith, “Russia Downscales Lunar Program
as Roscosmos Morphs into State Corporation.” 29 Dec
2015, spacepolicyonline,
http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/russiadownscales-lunar-program-as-roscosmos-morphs-intostate-corporation.
20
Skolkovo Space Cluster briefing, October 2016,
courtesy of Ivan Kosenkov.

partners, and clients on world markets.”21 Thus
far, the Russian private space sector supported by
Skolkovo can claim some modest victories. For
example, Dauria Aerospace won a contract in
2012 to create two small space vehicles for
Roscosmos. Dauria eventually launched two
Perseus-M microsatellites in the United States in
2014. Dauria is still active—working on two
smallsats for Roscosmos and developing an earth
observation platform named Auriga. Other
companies with successes include: SPUTNIX
(ground equipment and test facilities for small
satellites), Spectralaser (laser ignition modules for
Soyuz engines), Kosmokurs (a reusable suborbital
launch vehicle for space tourism and scientific
experiments) and Lin Industrial (family of light
launch vehicles for small satellite launches).
Still, advocates of Skolkovo acknowledge that the
number of private space endeavors in Russia is
relatively small and the pace of growth could be
better. Many blame Roscosmos for the short list
of successes to date. In March 2016,
representatives from Russian private space
companies and Roscosmos debated the level of
cooperation between Roscosmos and private
companies in Russia. Only last year did
Roscosmos say it would allow private companies
access to the space services market, and not
before 2020.22 Others report passive resistance
from Roscosmos against private companies, for
example, demanding detailed designs and models
of proposed systems before discussing funding.
This is not surprising since as a state corporation,
Roscosmos does not have much reason to support
private start-ups that become competitors.
There are impediments to private space business
in Russia other than Roscosmos and the systemic
factors already listed. Besides decreasing state
funding, Russian firms also lack adequate private
investment. In addition, some point out that
Russians, often capable of great technological
innovation, are not as steeped in the capitalist
21

Ivan Kosenkov, “Role of Skolokovo in the
Development of the Russian Private Space Industry,”
May 2015, IASP 2015 32nd World Conference
Proceedings, Beijing,
http://iasp2015beijing.csp.escience.cn/dct/page/70085.
22
Collinson, 4 March 2016.
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ethos of recognizing and addressing needs of the
market.
CONCLUSION
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia focused on forming an internationally
competitive public space sector and consciously
chose not to establish a competitive private space
sector. Skolkovo’s space cluster does provide
support for private Russian companies, but
numerous institutional factors in the Russian
Federation will continue to challenge space
entrepreneurs, and Roscosmos will likely gobble
up those that show any promise. The one likely
exception to this stagnation turns out to be in
national security space capabilities.
More broadly, the overall Russian space
enterprise wallows in a systemic crisis due to
multiple factors and, despite positive rhetoric
from the government, likely faces yet another
generation of stagnation and decreasing market
share. In the best case, which seems unlikely,
Russia’s space industry will survive and protect
its own systems while slowly rebuilding its once
great national space capability. Even under this
best-case scenario, it would likely take a
generation to address the many systemic issues
facing Russia. The worst-case scenario is a
complete collapse of the Russian space sector
except for military capabilities. This also seems
unlikely given the numerous, albeit modest,
attempts to generate a private space sector in
Russia and the government’s clear priority on
national security and public organizations.
The most probable path for the Russian space
sector is enduring stagnation with the odd success
outside of critical national security missions, but
nothing akin to its former glory. Sadly, following
twenty-five years of opportunity, Russia space is a
poster child for how not to evolve for the next
century of space challenges.

8

Article

Legislating for Humanity’s Next Step: Cultivating a Legal Framework
for the Mining of Celestial Bodies
Joseph Crombie
Rapid expansion in the space sector by state and private sector actors highlights the need for a new legal
regulatory framework, particularly regarding property rights. The exploitation of space-based resources
through the mining of asteroids is currently subject to a cold-war era international agreement that did
not include clear consideration about how future off-world commercial exploitation might be regulated
or property rights assigned. This article explores two empirical examples, the International Seabed
Authority and the International Telecommunication Union, to determine whether they provide useful
models of a future international legal framework for off-world property rights.

Exploration and exploitation of resources
are central themes for Homo sapiens. The history
of mankind is littered with examples of great
distances and heroic challenges overcome in the
face of adversity. After years of steadfast growth,
the space industry now appears on the cusp of a
new era of rapid expansion in its capabilities and
its users (Space Report 2015; Sommariva 2014).
Using the in situ resources of outer space,
commercial enterprise hopes to replicate the
private economic growth experienced when new
frontiers were explored and developed on earth.
To allow this to happen, an updated legal
framework is needed to reflect technical
developments and ambitions in the contemporary
space industry and, which allows, in particular, for
property rights to be assigned on celestial bodies,
permitting their mining and utilization.
The central research objective of this article is to
examine those ambiguities concerning property
rights as they relate to celestial bodies. The
analysis is exploratory, highlighting advantages
and challenges of the empirical examples studied.
The first section, below, explores the current legal
framework for space activities. The second
section details the United Nations role in
international cooperation on space. The third and
fourth sections respectively analyze existing
models of intergovernmental administration
namely, the International Seabed Authority and
the International Telecommunications Union,
providing an informed understanding of what a
future legal property rights framework for
celestial bodies might include, and what it might

not. Consideration is also given to how property
rights on celestial bodies might be governed.
CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
GOVERNING SPACE ACTIVITY
Four international treaties have come into
existence through United Nations (UN)
resolutions that condition public and private
activity in space. International agreements are
vital to global commerce because private
companies will be less likely to risk their capital
without widely shared legal assurances and a
regime of mutually recognizing contractual
obligations. The first and most significant
agreement is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)
(UNOOSA 1967). The OST is the focal point of
space law and considers the exploitation and use
of outer space as the “province of all mankind”
(UNOOSA 1967: 3). This guarantees the freedom
of access to space for all states, outlaws national
appropriation and the placement of nuclear
weapons, forbids military uses of celestial bodies,
and sets out a state’s duties and liabilities relevant
to its domestic space activity (Johannsson et al.
2015). In regard to the OST forbidding military
uses of outer space, it should be noted that this is
specific to outlawing all weapons testing, military
maneuvers and the creation of military
installations only (UNOOSA 1967).
The Rescue Agreement of 1968 was designed to
give astronauts any assistance they required in
distress, obliging states that they “shall
immediately take all possible steps to rescue them
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and render them all necessary assistance”
(UNOOSA 1968: 6). The agreement also
mandated states to provide assistance to a launch
state in recovering space objects that returned to
earth outside of their territory.
The Liability Convention of 1972 identified that a
space object causing damage or loss to human life
would be the responsibility of the launching state:
“a launching state shall be absolutely liable to pay
compensation for damage caused by its space
object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft
flight” (UNOOSA 1972: Article 1).
Finally, the Registration Convention of 1975 was
intentioned to provide a mechanism to assist states
in the identification of space objects. The
agreement created a registry of all objects sent
into space, maintained by the Secretary General
and available to all (UNOOSA 1975).
A fifth treaty, the 1979 Moon Agreement, was not
ratified by any major spacefaring state (Gangale
2009). Christol (1982) argues the primary flaw of
the Moon treaty was its inclusion of the Common
Heritage of Mankind (CHM) principle. This was
an extension to a celestial body of the Province of
Mankind principle within the OST. Hoffstadt
(1994) contends that CHM caused disagreement
because it was perceived by states as ambiguous,
and Pop (2009) alleges it was connected to the
‘New International Economic Order’ favoring
developing countries that was shunned by
developed states.
THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND THE
DEBATE ABOUT PROPERY RIGHTS
A crucial obstacle facing the
commercialization of outer space and
manifestation of private sector ambition is the
issue of property rights; these cannot be assigned
currently because to insinuate a state has
sovereignty over what is being claimed violates
the OST’s non-appropriation principle. As
Gleeson (2007) notes, international laws apply to
states rather than individual entities, placing the
responsibility upon the state to enforce entities
operating on its territory or on its behalf to
conform to international legal obligations. This
places the state accountable for the licensing,
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authorization and ongoing supervision of its
national space activities.
The establishment of property rights within a legal
framework is essential to creating an optimal
environment for the development of private sector
led economic activity in outer space (Johannsson
et al, 2015; Tronchetti, 2014). Jakhu & Buzdugan
(2008) argue that clarifying issues surrounding
right of way, spectrum rights, intellectual property,
mineral rights, and title deeds are necessary first
steps but cannot be undertaken under the current
legal apparatus. For private companies to extract
lucrative resources from asteroids or the moon,
they would expect to establish property rights to
protect their ownership of the minerals they mine.
Widely shared legal norms would likely need to
be a starting point for many commercial business
plans. Article 2 of the OST expressly forbids the
national appropriation of celestial bodies via
claims of sovereignty, use or occupation or any
other means (UNOOSA 1967). But contradicting
arguments exist over whether a ban on national
appropriation extends to a ban on individual
appropriation, as will now be examined.
While the national appropriation of celestial
bodies is explicitly forbidden within the OST, the
appropriation by individual means is not explicitly
outlawed. Gorove (1968) argues as the dominant
proponent of a minority of authors that “the
[Outer Space] Treaty in its present form appears
to contain no prohibition regarding individual
appropriation” (1968: 42) although the generally
accepted view is that private appropriation and
property rights are not allowed under the OST
(O’Donnell & Goldman 1997). A principal reason
articulated by Sterns et al. (1996) is that states are
not able to license for private appropriation that
“which cannot be appropriated publicly” (1996:
53).
Pop (2000) argues that even if a property claim is
made it would be unenforceable because to
recognize the property claim would be implying
national sovereignty over the territory in question
and would constitute national appropriation.
Indeed, even before the creation of the OST, Jenks
(1965) argued that “states bear international
responsibility for national activities in space; it
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follows that what is forbidden to a state is not
permitted to a chartered company created by a
state or to one of its nationals acting as a private
adventurer” (1965: 201). Academic literature
overtly favors the argument that private
appropriation is outlawed on celestial bodies.
Consequently, Lambright (2003) argues that
property rights cannot be claimed by prospective
private mining firms on celestial bodies under the
existing legal framework.
Some legal commentators have questioned
whether asteroids should be defined as celestial
bodies or “whether they should be seen instead as
chattel because they are moveable property”
(Feinman 2014: 220). In support of this, Tingkang
(2012) argues that while it is not feasible to move
a planet or a moon, an asteroid can be captured
and its path altered, and this reclassification would
allow for property rights to be claimed and the
extraction of resources outside the legal umbrella
of the OST. However, this change in definition
would not address issues such as how different
pieces of a chattel would be claimed, underscoring
the need for a new legal framework and not
simply a reinterpretation of the existing one. The
traditional role of international law is to clarify
and regularize state behavior (Leib, 2015). Thus,
the ambiguity created under the OST highlights
that it is lacking in its key purpose and a new
framework is required.

the revolution in the private sector’s role has been
driven by political and economic trends “towards
privatization, commercialization, deregulation,
and globalization of almost all human activities”
(Jakhu & Buzdugan 2008: 205).
The private sector space industry has burgeoned
considerably by the prospect of exploiting what
are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the virtually
limitless mineral resources located within celestial
bodies. This sector exists alongside and as part of
other commercial space players investing in
communications, imagery, and launch services.
The advancement of analyzing asteroid geology
using spectroscopic analysis has allowed for the
identification of resources contained within nearearth asteroids (Sommariva 2015), with the
recognition of valuable elements such as platinum
group metals, gold, and many others in
gargantuan quantities (Lladó et al. 2014). The
Earth’s moon has been identified as having large
quantities of Helium 3, an element relatively
scarce on Earth and vital for future nuclear fusion
development (D’Souza et al. 2006). The largest
companies are all based in the United States
(O’Neill 2015) suggesting an advantage to
technologically advanced economies that have the
ability to conduct speculative research.

Space policy has previously been
manifested through international politics and state
rivalries in the form of prestige projects and the
substantial growth in the number of military and
civilian satellites. But the rapid growth of privatesector enterprise has drastically altered the
dynamics of space policy. Since the birth of the
space age, the principal and predominantly only
players in the space arena have been major space
powers such as the United States and Russia.

When the OST was negotiated there was no
consideration of the technologies that would
become commonplace in the future or the growth
in the private sector. The size of the space
industry has seen steady growth, to $330 billion in
2014, of which 76% was made up of commercial
space activities (The Space Report 2015).
Between 1996 and 2006, satellite manufacturing
within the United States achieved annual growth
levels of 11%, while the rest of the world
achieved around 13% (Anderson 2015). Garretson
(2008) notes that the number of spacefaring
nations will increase as costs are driven down and
private operators offer cost effective options to
developing states.

States committed significant investment of public
money into space exploration to gain prestige,
security, and for strategic competition with fellow
states (Leib, 2015). While these rationales are
decidedly present among state motivations today,

Garretson (2008) believes the increase in space
actors will lead to a higher probability of
accidents, problems, and unnecessary tensions
that could be avoided through an up-to-date
strategy to manage and further develop space. As

CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS
SHAPING THE SPACE SECTOR
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space increasingly becomes a strategic “center of
gravity” (Gleeson 2007: 146) for many within the
international community, it is important that fresh
changes are brought about to address how states
and their entities safeguard their interests within
space. Sommariva (2014) argues that efforts
should be made to enlarge the discussion to create
an informed public debate on a matter that affects
the lives of everyone on earth.
The United States has historically enjoyed a
global leadership position in regard to space
activities (Cremins & Spudis 2007), meaning it
can exert strong influence on the processes
characterizing space activity. In 2014 a bill was
introduced to Congress that later went on to
become the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act (Congress 2016). The core
of the bill was a provision that recognizes U.S.
commercial asteroid resource companies’ property
rights over the resources they extract. Tronchetti
(2014) argues that while the bill is not intended to
extend American ownership over asteroids, this
could be its legal effect. Tronchetti (2014) further
argues that the Act goes against principles created
by the OST and amounts to an attempted
amendment of the treaty.
The United States is not the only country to have
developed such legislation. Luxembourg
announced that it would “seek to jump-start an
industrial sector to mine asteroid resources in
space by creating regulatory and financial
incentives” (Selding 2016:1). The emergence of
independent domestic legislation further
showcases the failure of the OST in not allowing
states to facilitate their own private sector growth
within the terms of the treaty.
When the OST was created, Feinmen (2014)
argues that it was positively received by the
international community. But the creation of
independent domestic legislation by states party to
the OST shows overt dissatisfaction with it in a
modern context. Many authors such as
Johannsson et al. (2015), Tronchetti (2014), and
Hertzfeld & von der Dunk (2005) argue for the
creation of a new international framework. The
academic debate on this matter shows an
inclination to argue that property rights cannot be
claimed under the OST, and multiple efforts to
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reinterpret its specifics highlight an aspect of law
that is now out of touch with reality.
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Since its inception in 1945, the United
Nations (UN) has been a key player in
international affairs. As Urquhart (1993) identifies,
following processes of decolonization and the
internationally paralyzing nature of the Cold War,
the UN became the arena for mediation and
conciliation among the world’s states, aiming to
maintain and promote international peace and
security.
Perez de Cuellar (1989), the UN’s fifth Secretary
General, serving 1982-1991, argued that “the
United Nations has been a witness, a catalyst and
an agent of a massive transition in global affairs”
(1989: 1). Its importance to, and central role in,
effecting global cooperation cannot be understated.
The values and norms that shape international
institutions and state sovereignty are constantly
subject to change as global society adapts to new
developments (Makinda 1998), but this has an
impact on how the UN is perceived, its influence,
and how effectively it can operate.
White (2008) describes a tension at the core of the
UN as angst regarding loss of sovereignty that is
assumed by international cooperation. Makinda
(1998) argues that there is a perception among
states that the UN erodes the authority of its
individual member states. So even though the UN
and other international organizations such as the
World Bank and World Trade Organization have
proliferated since the end of World War II,
suggesting acceptance by states of their validity as
international players, their increase in powers is
often associated with alarm among domestic
policy makers who feel their sovereignty is being
threatened (White 2008). Nevertheless, the UN’s
experience in international dialogue means that it
plays a crucial role in determining the sovereign
expectations a state should have.
The agenda of the UN is set by the intentions and
aims of its members and is subject to a wide array
of differing motives, with the most powerful
member states able to table more coercive ideas
successfully. Historically, the attempted passage
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of space legislation that contravenes the interests
of the space powers such as the United States or
Russia has been ignored. For example, the 1976
Bogotá declaration, signed by several states on the
Equator, attempted to assert sovereignty over their
respective portions of favorable geosynchronous
orbit, but it was widely ignored by more powerful
states.

to one of the country’s “fair weather friends”
(Mingst 2003: 82). The desire to maintain the full
range of sovereign options along with the
dominant role of hegemonic influence within the
UN and its space agreements are factors for
consideration when forecasting the nature of
future governance, including property rights on
celestial bodies.

The Bogotá declaration, and the aforementioned
Moon Treaty, did not serve the interests of the
major space powers and were consequently
disregarded. It is clear that international space
legislation will not become universally recognized
or implemented unless it is supported by the
hegemonic space powers such as the United States
or Russia. Overall, it is reasonable to assume that
any future agreement concerning the property
rights of celestial bodies must have the support of
the key actors if it is to be implemented
universally and successfully.

THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED
AUTHORITY (ISA): AN IDEOLOGICALLY
CONTENTIOUS AGENCY IN ITS INFANCY

There is precedent for international agreement
concerning space to be created outside of the UN.
Hertzfeld and von der Dunk (2005) highlight the
case of the International Space Station (ISS),
which allows participating states to classify each
module of the space station associated to them as
“quasi territory” (2005: 88). The agreement
between the participant states of the ISS allows
for seamless travel for its resident astronauts
between modules contributed by numerous states
and as Leib (2015) notes allowed states to retain
jurisdiction including criminal jurisdiction over
their citizens who are in the ISS. But this is a
confined agreement with little validity as a
template for circumstances outside of and beyond
the confines of the ISS.
The UN is the principal international body for
cooperation and the maintenance of peace, but the
reality is arguably more complex because the role
of the hegemonic powers is key to how future
dialogue will be shaped. Sommariva (2015)
maintains that it is vital the United States remain
open to cooperation with other states in creating
an international legal and institutional framework
for the advancement of the space economy. The
role of the United States within the United
Nations will be critical, but this opportunity
comes at a time when the UN has been relegated

The International Seabed Authority (ISA)
was created in 1994 following international
recognition of the need for a supranational form of
governance of areas outside traditional zones of
state sovereignty, after entry into force of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). While it is closely aligned with the
United Nations (UN) hierarchy, it is an
autonomous international organization (Wood
2008). Nandan (2006) states that the ISA was
established to provide vital protection to investors
by giving them exclusive rights over seabed areas
through ISA contracts or licenses.
This section analyses the ISA model for its
applicability and relevance to any future model
concerning or regulating the property rights of
celestial bodies. The ISA’s principle role is that of
supranational administration over mining
activities beyond sovereign jurisdiction, so
immediate parallels can be drawn with a potential
future body to protect the interests of businesses
planning to mine celestial bodies. Indeed,
Johannsson et al. (2015) argues that the
operational structure of the ISA could provide “a
viable model for overseeing asteroid mining
activities” (2015: 181). But the ideological
foundation of the ISA, namely the principle of
“Common Heritage,” will be discussed and
reviewed for the likely impediment that it might
cause in future inter-state dialogues or agreements
given contemporary political contexts.
The establishment of the ISA provided a new
legal framework in which the seabed is owned as
property for all mankind; its ownership and
utilization existed outside of the Westphalian state
legal system (Brearley 2006). Part XI of
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UNCLOS, adopted by UNCLOS III in 1982, was
the largest part of the convention, the most
contentiously negotiated, and the most relevant to
the deep seabed-mining regime, laying the
foundation for the ISA (Lodge 2002).
The ISA was established on 16 November 1994 to
implement the UNCLOS agreement for the “Area,”
meaning the “seabed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”
(UNCLOS Article 1: 1; Lodge 2002). The ISA
remit also included the power to regulate and
protect marine ecosystems, coastlines, and the
marine environment from hazards and pollution
(Chircop 2011). The activities in the Area were
described as “all activities of exploration for, and
exploitation of, the resources of the Area”
(UNCLOS Article 1: 3). This means the role of
the ISA was the “organization through which
States Parties shall organize and control activities
in the Area, particularly with a view to
administering the resources of the Area”
(UNCLOS Article 157: 1).
The ISA comprises three bodies: the assembly,
which is the supreme body, and the one to which
the other two bodies—the council, and the legal
and technical commission—are accountable
(Lodge 2002). The three ISA bodies operate
through consensus with decisions taken on a
practical and technical basis; this is in contrast to
the ideological concerns that marked the initial
negotiation of UNCLOS during the cold war
(Wood 2008).
Ultimately, the ISA’s primary function is to
regulate deep-sea mining, which is mining taking
place outside of the 200 nautical mile exclusive
economic zone of states (Glasby 2002). The
activities that it can regulate include “drilling;
dredging; excavation; waste disposal; and
construction and operation or maintenance of
installations, pipelines, and other devices related
to such activities” (UNCLOS Article 157: 1). It
should be noted that the ISA does not have
jurisdiction over the seabed as a whole. For
example, as Brearley (2006) notes, under
UNCLOS III, states can lay cables and pipelines
on the seabed without the consent of the ISA.
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The need for the ISA as a governing body was
driven by projections of abundant resources on the
sea bed, similar to the profuse projected resources
from off-world mining. J. L. Mero in Mineral
Resources of the Sea (1965) set prospectors’
pulses racing by describing a virtually
inexhaustible supply of nickel, copper, cobalt, and
manganese on the floor of the Pacific Ocean.
Many of these undersea prospectors saw the ocean
floor in much the same way as those who claim
the existence of huge reserves and profitable
opportunities for economic exploitation of scarce
and valuable minerals on celestial bodies.
Yet, despite UNCLOS and what Brewer (1985)
argues was the openness of financiers to the
extraordinary conditions surrounding deep sea
mining, the reality of seabed mining seems less
likely than ever. Lodge (2002) argues that
commercial interest in seabed mining has
dwindled to the point where it has now become a
remote possibility, and Broadus (1987) contends
that the reserves of nickel, copper, cobalt, and
manganese, the principal metals that would be
mined on the seabed, are more than adequately
served by land-based supplies for the foreseeable
long term. Deep sea mining has thus not begun in
any viable sense. In the absence of commercial
interest in deep seabed mineral resources, the role
of the ISA has been modest (Keyuan 2010). This
also limits the opportunity to analyze examples
that could be applied to any possible model for
exploiting celestial bodies.
While commercial prospects for future deep sea
mining appear slim in the immediate term, the
ISA has approved plans for exploration and has
entered into 15-year agreements with twenty-six
contractors (International Seabed Authority 2017).
The authority itself is also authorized to conduct
its own mining operations and has full legal
personality along with legal immunity (Chircop
2011). The ISA can also contract with private and
national companies as long as it is awarded a site
of equal size or value (Nagender Nath & Sharma
2000).
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THE COMMON HERITAGE PRINCIPLE
What makes the ISA exceptional in regard
to international bodies is that its work is guided by
the principle of the “Common Heritage of
Mankind” (CHM). CHM means that the rights and
resources in the area belong to mankind as a
whole and are exercised by the ISA on behalf of
mankind (Yu & Ji-Lu 2011). CHM is a
fundamental principle in the new customary law
of the sea arising from UNCLOS (Lihai 1993).
However, a lack of clarity still exists concerning
the CHM principle; there are though, commonly
agreed features that include “the area is not
subject to national sovereignty; all states are to
share in the management of the area; benefits
from the area are to be distributed evenly; the area
is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes”
(Brearley 2006: 51).
Authors such as Glasby (1986) argue that the
CHM principle was contentious and caused
disagreement among many states. The United
States, in particular, found fault with the CHM
principle, and the Reagan administration criticized
UNCLOS for accepting CHM as a conventional
principle of international law. The administration
also saw the ISA as complex and unnecessary
bureaucracy, while Joyner (1996) argues that
American concern over CHM was motivated by
the potential for what it perceived as international
socialism to be applied to celestial bodies at a
later date. Consequently, the United States did not,
and so far has not, ratified UNCLOS and is not a
member of the ISA.
It is clear that the CHM principle has created
division and hindered consensus in regard to
international agreements. This was plainly
illustrated with the Moon Agreement of 1984
where the inclusion of CHM is blamed by Leib
(2015) for creating contention and ultimately
playing a key part in the low acceptance rate by
states. Although UNCLOS and the Moon
Agreement are not directly comparable, both
regimes do share similarities because each was
designed to implement the concept of CHM.
In examining the ISA much insight is provided to
inform a potential model of a celestial body

resource authority. But if the ISA’s key
ideological foundation, CHM, has been rejected in
treaties covering space, including the Moon
agreement, this inevitably raises questions over
whether it can be applied beyond the ISA. States
party to the Moon Agreement haven’t even begun
discussions to create the contemplated
international regime it would involve, illustrating
its signatories lack of will to fully enact the treaty.
While there is much in the ISA model which
might be relevant to mining on celestial bodies,
incorporating the CHM principle seems certain to
cause unease if it is included in future agreements.
CHM assigns key preconditions to any possible
ownership solutions which could detrimentally
influence the success of any agreement on
celestial body property rights.
A particularly unique aspect of the ISA’s model,
but a potential problem if applied to off-world
mining, is the way in which it distributes the
revenue it derives from its range of activities. The
ISA is required to use the revenues gained to
cover (in order of priority), “administrative
expenses; equitable distribution between states…
with special attention… to the needs of
developing countries; funds for the Enterprise;
and compensating states affected by market
changes due to activities in the Area” (Brearly
2006: 53).
These arrangements illustrate the ISA’s
inclination towards practicing social justice. The
commitment of the ISA to addressing the needs of
developing states applies positive discrimination
within the international system. However, this
would arguably be unpopular if applied to the
space context, considering the vast costs to states
and private actors associated with accessing and
retrieving mineral resources. The ISA is
undoubtedly ambitious in its redistributive remit,
but this ambition hinders its applicability, in the
modern political context, to acting as a template
for an organization administering the property
rights of celestial bodies.
The ISA is an organization in its relatively early
stages and the practical application of its role has
been limited so far, but it undoubtedly has great
potential as an organization administering the
huge quantities of mineral wealth that are claimed
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to lie beneath our oceans. Nandan (2006) argues
that since its inception the ISA has established
itself as a reliable global institution despite being
a modest-sized operation. The powers of
commercialization have not challenged the
ideological status quo of the deep sea bed regime
because it has not been commercially viable to
mine these areas. But the ISA’s moral principles,
if applied to space, may become challenged when
subjected to the pressures and expectations of
enterprise. Any legal regime developed for
property rights on celestial bodies will no doubt
be conditioned by the dispute surrounding the
CHM principle, which is likely to be a significant
conditioning factor.
THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION:
AN EFFECTIVE, IF LACKLUSTER,
INSTITUTION
This section analyses how successfully
the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) engages with and accomplishes its role of
administering the most important activity in the
contemporary space sector: the allocation of radio
frequencies and slots in the geostationary orbit
(GEO). The ITU’s merits and flaws are critiqued
to give an informed perspective on whether it can
be a template for creating an international
agreement governing the legal framework of
property rights on celestial bodies.
The International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) was created in 1932 following the merger
of the International Telegraph Union, established
in 1885, with the signatories to the International
Radio Telegraph Convention of 1906 (Cowhey,
1999). The International Telegraph Union was
established as part of an agreement between
twenty European states that allowed for
interoperability between international telegraph
networks (Zacher 2002). The primary motive
behind the establishment of the International
Telegraph Union, and later the ITU, was the need
to guarantee the continuous function of
communication across borders. While initially
only operating in Western Europe, overarching
standards covering costs and payment
mechanisms allowed for international standards to
be set (Shahin 2011).
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The ITU is one of the oldest functional purpose
international organizations in the world. It is
guided by voluntary agreements and became a
specialized United Nations (UN) agency in 1947
(Wallenstein 1977). The administrative and
diplomatic aspects of the ITU’s work are
discussed by its member states at plenipotentiary
conferences held once every four years. This gives
direction to the administrative and policy support
work for the institution and its eight hundred
Geneva-based staff (Shahin 2011).
The ITU serves to facilitate the seamless
communication of information within and across
borders. The period preceding the establishment
of common standards and a guiding international
body was rife with restricted communication
networks that would stop at borders due to
incompatibility (Shahin 2011). This scenario
extrapolates to one where states offer differing
methods of recognizing celestial body property
rights that are not mutually honored, creating
difficult market conditions for all actors.
It has been discussed how domestic legislation,
such as by the United States in its Space Act of
2015, set domestic standards that may not
correlate with the domestic legislation of other
states, creating potentially competing standards.
While it is uncommon for the sovereign priorities
of states and the internal legal processes of two
states to be identical, a certain degree of
harmonization is crucial. If left alone, this would
inevitably have the effect of restricting the
development of off-world resource mining, as
differing standards would be likely to inhibit
market growth. Many authors argue that the
globalization of telecommunications networks and
introduction of common standards has enhanced
international cooperation and enabled
international telecommunications to flourish
(Cowhey 1999; Krasner 1991; Ruggie 1975). It is,
therefore, reasonable to argue that international
cooperation would flourish in a similar manner
following the introduction of common standards
for off-world property rights.
Parallels can be drawn between motivations for
creating seamless function and the setting of
universal standards that created the ITU on the
one hand, and factors now providing momentum
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to create an international agreement on the
property rights of celestial bodies allowing for
their exploitation. International agreement can
create overarching standards. These govern how
international and domestic companies offer their
goods on a global market and the environment
within which private and public actors in states
would operate. Just like the establishment of the
ITU, these are national issues that require
international agreement.
The role the ITU currently plays directly in the
space arena is the allocation of radio frequencies
and satellite orbital slot positions in geostationary
orbit. This is within the ITU’s mandate because
satellites allow for the optimal expansion of
telecommunications services, both nationally and
globally (Jakhu 2007). The largest sector of the
space industry is currently telecommunication
services, characterized by continual expansion and
innovation, and worth over $195 billion (Satellite
Industry Association 2014). The ITU thus
oversees the largest area of the contemporary
space sector.
Radio frequencies and orbital positions are a
scarce resource. Indeed, since 1973 the ITU has
described them as a “limited natural resource and
that they must be used rationally, efficiently and
economically” (ITU 2011: 42). Only a finite
number of frequency bands and orbital slots can
be allocated without potential harmful
interference between them. Of course, while radio
frequencies or satellite orbital slots cannot be
depleted in the same way as fish reserves or
minerals, their stock is finite, and this engenders
competition for the best slots and frequencies. The
importance of the ITU is highlighted by the fact
that there are over 1,419 satellites currently
orbiting Earth (Union of Concerned Scientists
2017), with each satellite registered with the ITU
given a unique orbital position and radio
frequency.
Using the ITU as a model or template for
establishing property rights in space is therefore
limited by the fact that it currently administers
activity for a relatively narrow aspect of space
utilization. The ITU does serve as a functional
example of what can be achieved through
international cooperation, but it must be

acknowledged that the area within which it
operates is constrained. A future agreement
concerning property rights on celestial bodies
would need to be more than a direct copy of the
ITU’s framework because it will apply to a far
different and wider arena.
The flexibility that the ITU provides through its
operational mandate given directly by member
states has, however, led to criticism that it has no
enforcement mechanisms. The ITU is made up of
member states and has no power to enforce its
own regulations over its members. The
organization also has no mandate to settle disputes
between members and expects that all states
should cooperate to find solutions (Jakhu 2007).
This has led to criticism that the ITU is incapable
of carrying out its own responsibilities. Cowhey
(1999) argues that the ITU has traditionally been
characterized as simply a set of technical rules
eliciting minimal commitment by its members.
Rendleman (2010) concurs that the ITU has been
dismissed as a “gentlemen’s club” because it is
too reliant on the goodwill of its members while
Harrison (2013) contends that historically the ITU
has acted as an expensive and exclusive club,
leading to the maintenance of high standards only
because the members had an interest in
maintaining decorum. This interest is critical to
international agreements, but whether a similar
concern would exist in regulating space resources
outside of telecommunication interests can only
be speculation.
The lowering of entry costs to the space arena has
allowed for new actors, and this has put pressure
on the ITU. Indeed, the ITU complains that
universities and others are launching satellites into
orbit without registering them with their relevant
national body, and it has no means to sanction the
state within which the offending organization is
based (Harrison 2013). This is evidence of the
problem facing organizations like the ITU that
many states will not readily agree to activities that
involve the transfer of their jurisdictional control
to an international body. Ceding jurisdiction to an
international body will only be accomplished if
there is a significant benefit to the state.
The ITU’s practice of allocating radio spectrum
and orbital slots on a first come, first served basis
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has also led to criticism. A state notifies the ITU
of its intention to start a service using certain
radio frequencies from a particular orbital position
and is then protected against damaging
interference from late comers (Lyall & Larson
2016). States seek to gain radio frequencies and
orbital positions as they deem appropriate for
enhancing their national interest, disregarding the
scarcity the ITU bemoans (Jakhu 2007).
ASCENDENCY OF NEOLIBERALISM
The adoption of neoliberal principles
denotes a marked shift from state-centric to
market-oriented views of communications among
the major spacefaring countries. While there are
competing definitions of neoliberalism, for the
purpose of this article it is assumed to mean
political principles and economic activities
grounded in the belief that markets should be
privatized to serve the public good. The ITU is an
influential and leading actor in the governance of
contemporary space-based activity; its policies
directly affect the ways in which space activity is
conducted.
Escobar (1995) argued that its decisions were
based disproportionately on the opinions of those
in power and that “our knowledge is ideological in
the sense that international organisations'
conceptions and means of description represent
the world as it is for those who rule it, rather than
for those who are ruled” (1995: 108). In the
context of globalization, such a view does not
appear out of date today, and as Cowhey (1999)
also noted, presciently, it was also necessary to
acknowledge increasing precedent for free trade
rules and the liberalization of the world economy
(Cowhey, 1999).
McCormick (2008) argues that the precedent has
manifested itself through the space
telecommunications sector, with the privatization
and restructuring of two of the world’s biggest
intergovernmental satellite organizations, Intelsat
and Inmarsat. The privatization of Intelsat and
Inmarsat represents creeping marketization of the
global commons in line with dominant elite ideas
concerning the supremacy of neoliberal principles.
Creation of a legal regime for the property rights
of celestial bodies will most likely put emphasis

18

on the role of private interests, on the basis that
governments tend to see them as essential for
driving economic development. The supremacy of
neoliberal principles and the dominance of ideas
favoring privatization suggest that a model for
celestial body property rights based on the ITU
would need to favor private interests.
The evolving nature of telecommunications and
the emergence of the ITU as a key actor in the
contemporary space arena has resulted in what
Shahin (2011) argues is the flexible nature of its
mandate. The ITU does have clear merit in that it
is a functional body, but it also has weaknesses.
Its lack of an enforcement mechanism means it
can be held hostage to the goodwill of its
members. Crucial for any future institution
governing the property rights of celestial bodies
would be whether it had the enforcement
mechanisms to ensure the implementation of its
mandate.
CONCLUSION
This article has used empirical examples
to examine what a future legal framework
governing the property rights of celestial bodies
might include. Private enterprises are setting their
sights on exploiting what they foresee as limitless
space-based resources. In order for this to happen
an internationally recognized and agreed legal
framework for allocating property rights has to be
determined for mining on celestial bodies such as
asteroids. The ambitions of private enterprise have
put increasing pressure on policy makers to create
international treaties that facilitate the
appropriation of celestial bodies’ resources
through the establishment of property rights.
The most significant existing treaty, the 1967
Outer Space Treaty (OST), guarantees the
freedom of space to all states and is widely held
not to allow appropriation by private or public
actors. Hence, those seeking to mine celestial
bodies cannot claim property rights under the
current legal framework. State or private
enterprises are unlikely to risk investment when
there is no regime of mutually respecting
contractual obligations and no legal basis giving
them property title to anything they mine.
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There is disagreement on whether the OST
explicitly prohibits individual or private
appropriation because the treaty does not provide
clarity on the status of the resources contained in
celestial bodies, in particular their exploitation
and commercial utilization (Leib 2015;
McCormick 2015; Hertzfeld & von der Dunk
2005).
However, much scholarly literature, legal
commentators, and policy makers favor the
argument that the OST does outlaw individual
appropriation. Some have suggested
circumventing this lack of clarity by classifying
asteroids as chattel (Feinman 2014) or applying
the accepted definition of “commercial use”
within the OST from “use,” which could allow
mining (Hobe & Schrogl 2009).
To eliminate such ambiguity, it can be argued that
only the establishment of a new legal framework
creating a clear and unambiguous property rights
regime can create the right conditions for private
sector led economic activity in outer space
(Johannsson 2015; Tronchetti 2014; Sommariva
2015). As space becomes an increasingly busy
arena through growing private involvement, it is
vital that international law adapts to contemporary
realities without simply seeking to reinterpret the
OST, whose principle purpose originally was
demilitarization (Hickman 2010).
Since its establishment, the United Nations has
been a vital actor in mediating and facilitating
peace around the world. While the organization
has strong historical precedent for mediation, it
suffers from tension among its members regarding
a loss of sovereignty that UN involvement is felt
to create (White 2008). However, the UN is the
body which, through the OST, has provided
guardianship over celestial bodies, acting as
custodian for mankind as a whole. It would thus
seem credible to assume the UN will play a role in
their future governance.
Without the support of key actors and spacefaring
powers, a universal agreement will not be reached.
The impacts of hegemonic influence and fragile
perceptions of sovereignty are key conditioning
factors in any role the UN may play in facilitating

future negotiations and the likelihood of a
practical deal being achieved.
An interesting legal precedent establishing
sovereignty in space exists outside of the UN
through the legal arrangement created for the
International Space Station, but this represents a
narrow agreement that is of limited relevance as a
template for establishing property rights on
celestial bodies. It does highlight that international
agreement for space can be cultivated outside of
the UN.
The International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) and the International Seabed Authority
(ISA) are each organizations that offer useful
parallels and potential models for any future
organization administrating the property rights of
celestial bodies, but each has notable flaws.
The ISA created a new distinct legal framework
because it was based on the principle of the
Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM). This
manifests operationally through the ISA being
authorized to conduct its own mining operations,
but private and state companies have to give a site
of equal value or size to any of their operations in
order to qualify for a license (Nagender Nath &
Sharma 2000). The ISA is also required to
distribute its revenues to states with a particular
focus on developing countries; this aspect of
social justice was not welcomed by the United
States, concerned that this was a form of
international socialism. CHM was included in the
ill-fated Moon agreement, and Leib (2015) argues
that it was central to its failure. This will
undoubtedly lead to tension in future agreements
governing celestial bodies and could be a sticking
point in negotiations. Ultimately, the CHM
principle and the lack of market interest in seabed
mining restrict the usefulness of the ISA as a
template for any future body governing celestial
body property rights.
The ITU administers the largest activity in the
space sector, allocating orbital slots and radio
frequencies for satellites, each of which is a
limited commodity. It involves a voluntary
arrangement between states which could be
attractive to policy makers keen to maintain
flexibility. However, the lack of an enforcement
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mechanism does not make treaty obligations any
less binding from a legal perspective. The ITU’s
longevity is evidence of the successful role that
states believe it plays, but as a template it has a
weakness, which is its lack of an enforcement
mechanism. Any future body governing or
regulating the property rights of celestial bodies
would have to include enforcement mechanisms
to allow for the implementation of what it is
meant to achieve, otherwise the characterizations
of infirmity leveled at the ITU (Jakhu 2007;
Cowhey 1999) will be just as valid.
The creation of overarching international
legislation to establish property rights on celestial
bodies arises because while these are national
issues, they ultimately require international
agreements. Domestic laws such as the US Space
Act of 2015 do not create overarching standards
for all states to abide by, nor do they create a
business friendly trade environment.
International agreements do carry the baggage of
domestic concerns and are influenced by
dominant ideologies. The dominance of
neoliberal ideas within global institutions is likely
to affect the outcome of any future agreement
regarding off-world property rights. Privatization
of two of the largest satellite organizations
(Inmarsat and Intelsat) also shows, from the
application of neoliberal ideas, the preference
favoring private interests in global affairs. This
likely presages what can be expected in a regime
governing the property rights of celestial bodies,
where the interests of the private sector may well
take precedence.
The current status quo under which space belongs
to everybody and nobody has become
unsustainable. The present legal regime offers
little support to public and private actors seeking
to grow the space industry. A new regime or set of
governing principles is desirable to allow the
potentially vast resources of the cosmos to be
utilized, creating a new space economy which is
of direct benefit to mankind. While the ITU and
ISA may not provide perfect templates, they do
offer beneficial and insightful information on
what future legislation may and may not include.
Ultimately, the realization of any private sector
ambition to mine celestial bodies, a prospect
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which promises high risk for substantial rewards,
is wholly dependent on the development of a
comprehensive legal regime that facilitates and
encourages it.
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Article

Managing Criminalized Power Structures: The Predominant Spoilers
of Peace Processes
Michael Dziedzic
Criminalized Power Structures (CPS) exploit illicit wealth acquisition to usurp political power and
constitute a leading source of obstruction when the international community intervenes in states
struggling to emerge from civil conflict. Structures operating outside domestic or international law may
constitute a crucial barrier or spoiler for UN and coalition peace operations. This held true in the postCold War interregnum before 9/11 and is likely to continue for stabilization operations, regardless of
outcomes from enormous international security investments in Afghanistan and Iraq. By understanding
the different types of spoilers acting across cases, the United States and partners in the international
community can align their responses so as to manage threats from CPS.

Twenty years ago Stephen Stedman
published “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,”
identifying spoilers as the “greatest source of risk”
to successful implementation of peace agreements.1
This sparked a prolific response in the literature.
Most of this scholarship, however, failed to address
the intent of Stedman’s article, which was to
develop “a typological theory of spoiler
management.”2 His actual aim was to assist policy
makers in “correctly diagnosing the type of spoiler”
and then devising appropriate “strategies that will
be most effective for particular spoiler types.”3
The number of cases Stedman was able to draw
upon in 1997 was limited to Angola, Cambodia,
Mozambique, and Rwanda. This restricted the range
of strategies available for evaluation. As Stedman
noted: “not all combinations of strategy and spoiler
type are covered in the cases, given the relatively
few cases of spoiler management in the 1990s. For
instance, neither coercive diplomacy nor use of
force to defeat the spoiler is included.”4
Accordingly, he regarded his conclusions as
provisional and hoped to inspire further research;
1
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however, as Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs
conclude in their 2011 review of the spoiler
literature, “much more research is needed in terms
of identifying various strategies for managing
already manifest spoilers under different
circumstances, a topic that has advanced
surprisingly little since Stedman’s (1997) original
article…”5
The purpose here is to summarize findings and
recommendations from recently published research
addressing ten cases of peace implementation from
1999-2016. These were featured in Criminalized
Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of
Peace, a work devoted to advancing Stedman’s
quest for a typological theory of spoiler
management.6
Findings from three cases are summarized below:
Bosnia’s Third Entity Movement (irreconcilable
spoiler), Kosovo’s Kosovo Liberation Army
(violent opponent with negotiable interests), and
Afghanistan’s Criminal Patronage Networks
(supporter of the peace process). Salient lessons
from the other cases from each type are included in
the discussion of the takeaways for that class of
spoiler. Our central finding is that strategies used in
5
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the most successful cases aligned with three
mutually reinforcing lines of effort involved in
conflict transformation (as defined in Quest for
Viable Peace).7 The primary audience for our
findings and recommendations is the policy
community since we seek to enhance international
capacity for spoiler management; however,
energizing the scholarly community to respond to
Stedman’s exhortation for research to advance a
typological theory of spoiler management is a
closely related intent.
This article provides empirical evidence that
criminalized power structures (CPS) constitute
perhaps the predominant spoiler threat to peace and
stability operations. This thesis builds on the
literature on war economies. The Economic
Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW) project conducted
by the International Peace Academy from 20002003 “addressed the critical issue of how the
economic agendas of armed factions sustain violent
conflict and inhibit durable peace” (Italics added).8
A 2003 EACW report characterized the
phenomenon in the following terms:
Policy analysis has produced important
insights on the impact that the predatory
and illicit exploitation of natural resources
and the pervasive criminalization of
economic life can have on conflict
dynamics…Both rebel or government
combatants who benefited from predation
during war may act as ‘spoilers’, using
force to undermine peace processes.9
This conceptualization of war economies
encompasses several characteristics that
are central to the way criminalized power
structures are defined here:
7
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Structures built on criminalized
political economies do not
magically dissolve with the
advent of a peace agreement.
The economic factors conducive
to violent conflict and its
persistence after a peace
agreement include
“criminalization of economic
life.” This term embraces the full
spectrum of illicit gray and black
market transactions described
below.
Both the state and an armed
opposition to it may exploit war
economies.

The imperative for addressing war economies is
encapsulated by Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum
in Political Economy of Statebuilding: “war
economies persist into peacetime, and are likely to
shape the character of the post-war political
economy. Transforming these very political wartime economies is a central challenge for
statebuilding operations.”10
CRIMINALIZED POWER STRUCTURES
The nexus between illicit wealth and
political power is the central defining
characteristic of a criminalized power structure.
When ill-gotten wealth plays a decisive role in the
competition for and maintenance of political
power, the result is an illicit political economy
orchestrated by a CPS. Power is typically
maintained by violent repression of opposition
groups and by dispensing patronage to a
privileged clientele group which can lead to
criminalization of both the public and private
sectors. This tends to produce a zero-sum political
economy conducive to conflict, but it may be
masked by other cleavages in society (e.g.,
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo).11 Criminally
10

Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum, eds., Political
Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace, (London
and New York: Routledge, 2013), 5.
11
For a discussion of Rwanda, see Bruce Jones,
“Military Intervention in Rwanda's ‘Two Wars’:
Partisanship and Indifference,” in Barbara Walter and
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derived wealth may be a motivation for acquiring
power (i.e., greed), or it may be a means used by
rebel groups for rectifying group grievances. CPS
may either capture the state or constitute an armed
opposition to it.
Power structures are criminalized when they are
sustained by economic transactions that violate
either domestic or international law. A
criminalized political economy may operate in
two dimensions: the gray and/or the black
economy. The gray economy involves
commodities that would normally be considered
legal; however, the transactions are conducted in
illegal ways. This includes evasion of customs
duties (i.e., smuggling), avoidance or selective
enforcement of regulations, manipulation of
exchange rates, violation of economic embargoes,
and looting of raw material resources. Cash and
material resources of the government may also be
siphoned off through misappropriation,
procurement kickbacks, stripping of assets from
state-owned enterprises, diversion of foreign
assistance, and privatization of state assets to
cronies at below market prices.
The black economy involves patently illegal
commodities typically associated with organized
crime. Common activities include trafficking in
illicit drugs, people, and weapons (in
contravention to an arms embargo), kidnapping,
extortion, and money laundering.
One likely contributing factor to the 50% rate of
return to conflict within five years after
international intervention, as claimed by Kofi
Annan, is that by overlooking this spoiler threat
and arriving unprepared to deal with it, missions
have squandered the “golden hour.” 12 In the cases
examined in this project, the average delay in
obtaining authorization for essential authorities
Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and
Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press,
1999). For Bosnia, see Oscar Vera and Karmen Fields,
“Bosnia: Third Entity Movement” in Dziedzic,
Criminalized Power Structures. For Kosovo, see
Covey, et al., Quest for Viable Peace.
12
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All,” Report
A/59/2005, March 2005, 8.

and capabilities to mount effective strategies has
averaged almost five years. The consequences
include allowing CPS to become entrenched,
driving down prospects for success (i.e.,
sustainable peace), and prolonging missions
indefinitely.
Since 1990, the UN has intervened in 24 countries
struggling to emerge from internal conflict.13 One
of these, El Salvador, was not seriously bedeviled
by a spoiler menace.14 At least 17 of the
remaining 23 cases, or 75%, involved
criminalized power structures, including three
discrete cases cited by Stedman (i.e., Rwanda,
Angola, and Cambodia):
 The ruling Hutu elite in Rwanda, the akazu,
viewed the Arusha Accords as a threat to
their predatory regime causing them to
mount a plot to instigate genocide as a
result.15
 Jonas Savimbi, leader of União Nacional
para a Independência Total de Angola in
Angola (UNITA), was able to reject his loss
in the 1992 Angolan elections because,
according to Stedman, he “continued to have
13

The internal conflicts in which the UN has
intervened since 1990 were in the following locations:
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia /Former Yugoslavia,
Burundi, Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Central African
Republic, Darfur, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq,
Kosovo, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan/Abyei, Western
Sahara. The eight underlined cases are those that case
study authors in Dziedzic, Criminalized Power
Structures determined involved criminalized power
structures as spoilers.
14
The author bases this assertion on his personal
observations as a U.S. Air Force attaché in El Salvador
during the “armed peace” from 1992-1994.
15
See David Keen, “The Economic Functions of
Violence in Civil Wars,” Adelphi Paper 320,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998, 63.
“(I)n Rwanda, attempts to end the 1992-94 civil war by
creating a democratic government prompted a
genocidal backlash from elements of the Hutu elite…”
See also Bruce D. Jones, "Keeping the Peace, Losing
the War: Military Intervention in Rwanda’s ‘Two
Wars’," Colombia University Institute for War and
Peace Studies, February 1997, 6. “As negotiations and
diplomacy weakened their position, the akazu turned
increasingly to violence to defend their power.”
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uninterrupted sources of revenue through
UNITA's control of diamond mines…”16
The Khmer Rouge (KR) in Cambodia,
Stedman notes, sustained their resistance to
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC) through “the inflow of arms and
petroleum and the outflow of gems and logs,
a major source of DK's [KR's] income.”17
Hun Sen, leader of the State of Cambodia,
refused to accept his loss in the 1993
elections and blackmailed UNTAC into a
power sharing arrangement. The result,
according to Global Witness, has been that
both Hun Sen and the Khmer Rouge
continued to finance their military activities
through illegal logging, and today “the
country’s most powerful logging syndicate
is led by relatives of Prime Minister Hun
Sen and other senior officials.”18

Our own research identifies eight discrete cases
(i.e., Afghanistan, Bosnia, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, and
Sierra Leone). The findings of another volume
confirm most of our cases and add Liberia to the
list.19 Evidence assembled by the Enough Project
in its study on violent kleptocracies in Africa adds
Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and the
Central African Republic.20 This is the basis for
16

Stedman, 40.
Ibid., 30.
18
“Cambodia,” Global Witness web site,
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/corruption/oil
-gas-and-mining/cambodia, accessed May 31, 2017.
19
Michelle Hughes and Michael Miklaucic, eds.,
Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and
Transition, (Washington, DC: Center for Complex
Operations, 2016).
20
John Prendergast, “Violent Kleptocracies: How
They’re Destroying Parts of Africa and How They
Can Be Dismantled,” Enough Project, October 2016,
available at http://enoughproject.org/reports/violentkleptocracies-how-theyre-destroying-parts-africa-andhow-they-can-be-dismantled [May 31, 2017];
“Millions of people have suffered and perished in the
ongoing wars in East and Central Africa, including
Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda,
and the Central African Republic. The big prize in
these deadly conflicts is the control of a hijacked state
and the natural resource wealth of the country. This
17
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claiming that criminalized power structures are
the predominant spoiler threat to peace and
stability operations.
SPOILERS
There are several conceptual and
typological differences in the approach taken here
as compared with Stedman’s path-breaking work
that need to be made explicit. First, he originally
equated spoiling behavior with the use of violence.
As Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs note, “More
research, however, ought to be devoted to the nonviolent aspects of spoiling behavior…a
phenomena we know only little about in spite of
its widespread occurrence.”21 This certainly
applies to criminalized power structures, and this
project has examined both violent and non-violent
forms of obstruction to peace implementation.
Second, the above revision of the spoiler
definition has implications for the typology that
should be used to guide the strategic response.
Clearly, strategies must be tailored to whether
violent or non-violent means are employed.
Stedman’s spoiler typology was based on the
nature of spoiler’s intentions (i.e., total, greedy, or
limited).22 A more useful approach is to
distinguish among types of CPS according to their
relationship to the peace process.
One of these distinctions must be whether they
use violent or non-violent means to oppose the
peace process. Additionally, Steadman’s
categories of intentions can be collapsed into
whether their interests are negotiable (i.e. greedy)
or irreconcilable (i.e., total). Stedman’s limited
spoilers, as he defines them, could fall into either
of the above categories. Finally, CPS can be
classified according to whether they support or
oppose the peace process.
Perhaps the central conceptual innovation of this
work is to propose that a CPS can have a profound
enables mass looting of state resources and diverting
state budgets into military and security spending to
perpetrate wars and to maintain power by any
means necessary.”
21
Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs, 617.
22
Stedman, 9-11.
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spoiling effect even if it does not overtly oppose
the peace process. The kleptocratic nature of a
CPS can produce a crippling loss of legitimacy or
a hollowing out of the state’s capacity to perform
essential functions (e.g., security). The
administrations of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan
and Nouri al Maliki in Iraq provide salient
examples of this. Accordingly, the examination of
the empirical record of the international
community’s efforts to deal with CPS in
Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked
Enemies of Peace is organized around these three
discrete types:




Irreconcilable Adversaries (oppose peace
process, use violence, irreconcilable
interests)
Violent Opponents with Negotiable
Interests (oppose peace process, use
violence, negotiable interests)
Supporters of the Peace Process (support
peace process, do not use violence,
negotiable interests)

The spoiler’s relationship to the peace process
also provides a handy yardstick for determining
whether the strategies adopted have been
successful or not by measuring their ability or
propensity to spoil the peace process. Success is
defined as eliminating the risk that CPS posed to
peace and stability. To determine whether the strategy
adopted by the mission made progress in “subduing” a
given CPS, we compare the type at the inception of
the intervention with the type it was when the case
study was completed.
Progress has been made with irreconcilables if
they have been neutralized or if they have been
compelled to negotiate. For a violent CPS with
negotiable interests, cessation of the use of
violence or opposition to the peace process
indicates success. For supporters of the peace
process, a reduction of illicit activities to the point
that they no longer constitute a threat to domestic
stability or allow the CPS to perpetuate itself in
power through illegitimate means constitutes
success. If no CPS existed prior to the intervention,
their emergence as a threat to the peace process
without an effective strategic response is a hallmark of
failure.

The purpose here is not to measure the success of the
overall intervention but rather to assess whether
spoiling activity was effectively reduced or ended so it
no longer threatened the peace implementation
process. The focus of analysis was to identify the
common denominators of success of strategies
used to confront each type of CPS. The
methodology used was structured, focused
comparison. This is the same methodology adopted by
Stedman.
We examined the following ten cases:
Irreconcilable Adversaries
Bosnia: Third Entity Movement; Guatemala:
Illegal Entities and Clandestine Security
Apparatus; Sierra Leone: Revolutionary
United Front; Haiti: Gangs of Cité Soleil
Violent Opponents with Negotiable Interests
Kosovo: Kosovo Liberation Army;
Democratic Republic of the Congo: M-23;
Iraq: Jaish Al-Mahdi
Supporters of the Peace Process
Colombia: Paramilitaries; Afghanistan:
Criminal Patronage Networks; Iraq: Nouri alMaliki
Considerations involved in selecting these cases
were the types of CPS involved (a minimum of
three cases was required for each type so that
generalizations could be drawn); a range of
successes, partial successes, and failures; a mix of
both states and insurgencies as CPS; and
geographic diversity. Findings from the Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Afghanistan cases are summarized,
below, along with a recapitulation of the general
findings from all other cases for each of these
types.
IRRECONCILABLE ADVERSARIES:
BOSNIA’S THIRD ENTITY MOVEMENT
The Bosnia case is distinguished by the
unequivocal success of the strategy that was
eventually implemented to prevent the Third
Entity Movement from scuttling the Dayton peace
process. On the other hand, it is typical of other
cases involving irreconcilables in that the grave
threat they posed was neglected for years. Case

Dziedzic / Criminalized Power Structures
study authors Oscar Vera and Karmen Fields
make clear that a simplistic diagnosis of the cause
of the conflict obscured a profound and fateful
reality:
The conventional interpretation of the
conflict as exclusively ethnic obscured the
role of the country’s criminalized power
structures in provoking the war and then
perversely collaborating with their
counterparts across ethnic lines to profit
from it. Owing to this blind spot…, the
ensuing peace settlement failed to come to
grips with the destabilizing impact of
Bosnia’s illicit political economy.23
Owing to this ignorance about the threat from
Bosnia’s three “parallel power structures,” there
were no provisions in the Dayton Peace Accords
to deal with their covert and sometimes violent
obstructionism. International police were unarmed
and empowered merely to mentor, monitor, and
train. The other components of the legal system
were ignored. This meant that Bosnia’s CPS were
effectively left to judge themselves. Although the
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) enjoyed
a robust mandate, it was focused exclusively on a
narrowly defined threat from the formal military
forces of the protagonists. When violent resistance
mounted, often in the form of “rent-a-mobs,”
IFOR branded appeals for their involvement as
“mission creep.” It took several years before it
would recognize that Bosnia’s criminalized
parallel power structures were the center of
gravity for stabilizing the conflict.
The Third Entity Movement contravened one of
the red lines of the Dayton Agreement since it
aspired to dissolve the Bosniak-Croat Federation
and create an entity co-equal with the Serbs and
Bosniaks. This would have been a potentially
irreversible step toward unification with Croatia,
which would have rendered the survival of the
Bosniak rump state untenable. The result would
almost certainly have been a return to conflict.
The only suitable strategic goal was to prevent
this non-negotiable project.
23

Oscar Vera and Karmen Fields, “Bosnia: The Third
Entity Movement.” in Dziedzic, Criminalized Power
Structures, 30.
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Croatian President Franjo Tudjman was the
driving force behind the Third Entity Movement,
and he continued to pursue this ambition
assiduously until he died in 1999. The clandestine
elements of this CPS included a nexus between
the Croatian Intelligence Service and its
counterpart in Herzeg-Bosna. There was also a
stay-behind unit of the Croatian Army that was
converted into the Monitor M Company to avoid
complying with the Dayton requirement that all
Bosnian Croat military units be placed under
Federation command. Other informal elements
were the Convict Battalion that had perpetrated
notorious acts of ethnic cleansing during the
conflict and the Renner Transportation Company
that was a cover for arms trafficking and other
transnational crime and the perpetrator of violent
confrontations with Moslem returnees.
One of the primary sources of illicit revenue for
the Third Entity Movement stemmed from
Tudjman’s diversion of proceeds from the sale of
Croatian state assets into the Hercegovacka Bank
in Mostar that had been established by the
Monitor M Company. From 1998 to 2000, $180
million a year was channeled into the bank. The
head of Monitor M, “former” Croatian Army
General Ante Jelavic, used these secret funds to
capture the Bosnian Croat vote in the 1998
Bosnian general elections and become the
Bosnian Croat member of the state-level tripresidency. Smuggling was another massive
source of revenue, and the Renner Transport
Company was central to this.
Among the debilitating flaws in the international
strategy was a requirement to conduct elections in
a year. This unseemly haste to turn ownership
over to local authorities profoundly exacerbated
the ability of Bosnia’s three CPS to obstruct
reform efforts because they gained a façade of
democratic legitimacy after the elections. Another
flawed component of the strategy was “relying on
institutions and leaders in the Federation and the
RS to arrest war criminals and investigate and
prosecute corruption, organized crime, and
domestic terrorism.”24 It took two years of
ineptitude before the Peace Implementation
24
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Council (PIC), an international body created to
oversee implementation of the Dayton Peace
Accords, sought to correct the impotence of the
civilian head of the mission, the High
Representative. In 1997 the PIC granted the High
Representative authority to cashier government
officials who obstructed Dayton along with the
power to bring reforms that local politicians
refused to enact into effect via decree (i.e., the
Bonn powers). Simultaneously, SFOR (IFOR’s
successor) was having an epiphany about the root
cause of the conflict actually residing in Bosnia’s
political-criminal power structures, causing it to
shed IFOR’s contemptuous attitude about
anything that smacked of policing. The
deployment to SFOR of a Multinational
Specialized Unit of “gendarme-like” forces with
expertise in use of non-lethal force for crowd and
riot control took place in 1998.
To lay the foundation for action against the Third
Entity Movement required use of the Bonn
powers to impose a witness protection law; amend
the Federation Supreme Court Law to make it the
court of first instance for cases involving
terrorism, drug trafficking, inter-Cantonal crimes,
and organized crime; and create the Federation
Prosecutor’s Office to try these cases. Personnel
working in these institutions were vetted by the
international community to assure an honest
judicial system. A special unit of the Federation
police was vetted and trained to apprehend
suspects.
Once the means had been put in place, the military
and civilian components of the international
community carefully coordinated intelligence-led
operations among themselves and trusted
members of the Bosnian community. The first
operation targeted the Renner Transport Company.
As the Federation Police were attempting to
launch the operation, it was leaked and the
suspects fled; however, this exposed linkages
between organized crime, the Cantonal Police,
and the Bosnian-Croat intelligence service
(National Security Service [SNS]).
This led SFOR to launch Operation WESTAR in
October 1999 against the SNS. This was an
unmitigated success resulting in confiscation of
forty-two computers laden with information about

illicit money-making schemes and espionage
against virtually the entire international
community. After assessing this trove of data,
SFOR discovered that the Croatian Intelligence
Service and SNS were working together and that
Croatia was sending money to support the Third
Entity Movement through the Monitor M
Company.
This led to the discovery of their Achilles heel:
the Herzegovacka Bank and the flow of illicit
revenues from Croatia. With support from SFOR
and the Federation Ministry of Interior and
Financial Police, the High Representative
mounted an operation to take control of the bank
seizing sufficient evidence to mount twenty
criminal investigations including eventual charges
against Jelavic.
Vera and Fields sum up the results as follows:
“(T)he Movement was dealt a fatal blow and
violent resistance to Dayton from Herzeg-Bosna
was ended.”25 Unfortunately for the prospects for
stabilization in the rest of Bosnia, however,
informal political-criminal structures continue to
hold sway in the Bosniak and Serbian polities.
Vera and Fields conclude with this trenchant
analysis: “(I)f the international community had
begun the intervention in Bosnia with a basic
understanding of the illicit, parallel structures in
power in each ethnic community, coupled with the
authority that was eventually granted at BonnPetersburg and the will to use it to hold the elites
at the top of these structures accountable, the odds
are that Bosnia would not be a dysfunctional state
today.”26
LESSONS FOR IRRECONCILABLE CPS


Failure to assess the CPS threat properly
is likely to place the mission in grave
jeopardy.

The interventions in Bosnia, as well as in Haiti
confronting the gangs of Cité Soleil and in Sierra
Leone dealing with the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF), all nearly collapsed owing to the
failure to recognize the existential threat that CPS
25
26
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constituted.27 One salient lesson is that the
attainment of a peace agreement does not equate
to a “post-conflict” environment. Planning should
accordingly be based on worst-case assumptions
about threats to the peace process. Another lesson
is that it is folly to dismiss the CPS threat as just a
“criminal” problem and not a concern for the
military contingent as occurred in Bosnia and
Haiti.


An effective way to deal with
irreconcilable CPS is use of superior force
in a proactive and coordinated manner by
both military and police contingents.

Once it is clear that the mission is confronting an
irreconcilable spoiler, the appropriate aim is to
dismantle and defeat it, preferably through arrest
and prosecution. Ironically, international
interventions have achieved their highest degree
of success in these cases—after initially courting
disaster. CPS threats in Bosnia and Sierra Leone
are the only cases we examined that were
eliminated, and both involved proactive use of
superior force by a robust military and police
contingent.




Intelligence was a critical enabler for the
operations mounted in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and
Haiti.

Allowing CPS ownership over the legal
system is not the way to end impunity.

In Bosnia and Guatemala (which confronted a
spoiler threat from a Clandestine Security
Apparatus), CPS initially retained their influence
over the legal system in spite of the extraordinary
courage of individual judges, prosecutors, and
police.29 Only after the international community
was empowered to play a direct role in the legal
system was the CPS spoiler threat tamed.


Use of intelligence-led operations is an
essential means.

The mission must ensure that the entire
legal continuum—from intelligence to
incarceration—is able to function.

In Haiti, the Joint Mission Analysis Center
collected critical tactical intelligence, but to use
this intelligence required a SWAT team to
conduct high risk arrests. In Bosnia, this
specialized policing capability was provided by
IFOR’s Multinational Specialized Units. The most
difficult gap in this continuum to fill, however,
has been to prosecute and convict CPS members
(See below).

Depriving CPS of access to illicit revenue
is an effective way to defeat them.

Essential to success in Bosnia was taking control
of the Herzegovacka Bank that had been the
source of illicit funds for the Third Entity
Movement. In Sierra Leone the mission mounted
operations to retake the diamond mines from the
RUF, their operational center of gravity.28
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For peace to be sustainable, the capacity
of local institutions to combat impunity
through the rule of law, transparency, and
accountability is essential.

The success in Sierra Leone has been sustained by
reform of the police, army, and intelligence
service with emphasis on accountability and
civilian control. In contrast, the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti suffered a two-year delay in
being provided a mandate to develop the rule of
law. Coupled with this has been the failure to
establish an effective accountability regime for the
Haitian National Police to deal with the risk of
politicization and criminalization of the country’s
only security force.

27
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VIOLENT OPPONENTS BUT NEGOTIABLE
INTERESTS:
KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY
Even though the conflict in Kosovo was
self-evidently driven by a dispute between
Albanian and Serb communities over who should
exercise sovereignty, the Kosovo Force (KFOR)
did not anticipate that its forces would face a
greater security challenge from violence against
the Serbs by extremist elements of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) than from armed
resistance by Serb forces. Also overlooked was
the less apparent but no less vicious struggle
within Kosovo’s Albanian community between
the KLA and followers of pacifist Ibrahim
Rugova to fill the power vacuum created by the
withdrawal of Serb forces. The instrument used in
this case was an assassination campaign against
Rugova’s supporters by the KLA’s National
Intelligence Service (SHIK) that subsequently
transferred its allegiance to the Democratic Party
of Kosovo (PDK), one of several political parties
formed by former KLA leaders.
In spite of its executive mandate, the UN Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) decided initially to rely
totally on the local judiciary, which effectively
meant use of Albanian judges, owing to the
inordinate risks Serb judges confronted. Within a
year the ensuing injustice meted out to Serbs and
the total impunity enjoyed by former KLA
members compelled UNMIK to introduce
international judges and prosecutors into
Kosovo’s legal system. The mission’s other
critical blind spot was the fixation on the formal
economy to the neglect of the need for effective
corporate governance structures to prevent the
illicit capture of revenue from publicly owned
enterprises, one third of Kosovo’s economy.
The litany of risks engendered by the failure to
recognize violent extremist elements within the
KLA as a CPS includes attempted ethnic
cleansing; use of clandestine intelligence
apparatchiks to eliminate political competitors; a
void in the rule of law; and the capture of a
sizeable segment of the economy that was
accounted for by publicly owned enterprises. The
golden hour was lost, and it took several years to
cobble together capabilities required to complete

the “intelligence-to-incarceration” continuum
needed to deal with violent obstructionism.
In spite of UNMIK’s initial shortcomings, the
mission did quickly establish that the KLA’s
interests were negotiable. The signing of the
“Undertaking” less than a month after the
inception of the mission obligated the KLA to
demilitarize and transform itself into an unarmed
civil defense force. This was a crucial step in
affording the KLA an alternative to the use of
violence to pursue their unsatisfied war aims.
Owing to his prior experience with CPS in Bosnia,
UNMIK Principle Deputy Jock Covey established
the mission’s way to deal with violent extremists:
support those who support the peace process and
oppose those who oppose it. For KLA extremists
and their Serb counterparts, the so-called
Bridgewatchers, “peace” was but the perpetuation
of conflict through other violent means. These
sources of continuing instability had to be
confronted, and the cost of violent obstructionism
had to be rendered prohibitive.
Simultaneously across all of UNMIK’s lines of
effort (political, security, rule of law, and
economic), this “stick” was matched with a
parallel effort to establish more attractive peaceful
and licit alternatives for the competition over
power and wealth. Eventually this overarching
strategy was branded “conflict transformation.”
As defined in Quest for Viable Peace, conflict
transformation “entails diminishing the means and
motivations for violent conflict while developing
more attractive, peaceful alternatives for the
competitive pursuit of political and economic
aspirations.”30 This strategy consists of three
reinforcing components:


Shape the context by dismantling or
disrupting spoiler networks so as to
neutralize their ability to thwart the peace
process.

This is not a task indigenous institutions can be
expected to discharge. The mission must come
prepared to confront the CPS threat itself;
30
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otherwise the golden hour will be squandered and
the mission may be placed in jeopardy. This step
is typically neglected, however, in favor of simply
developing institutional capacity and transitioning
to national ownership. In the presence of CPS
with a high degree of overlap between criminal
and political power, failing to shape the context
first is a fatally flawed strategy.
There are potentially replicable principles in the
way UNMIK implemented this strategy. First,
since it had to rely heavily on KFOR initially,
these two entities needed to establish collaborative
civil-police-military decision making and
planning mechanisms. Second, at the heart of the
strategy was the conduct of joint military and
police intelligence-led operations to strike against
militant extremists. Third, confronting the
impunity of CPS requires the deployment of the
full continuum of rule of law capabilities from
intelligence to incarceration, and internationals
need to arrive prepared to take the lead. Finally,
the center of gravity of the economic strategy is to
deprive violent obstructionists of their sources of
illicit revenue.


Develop institutional capacity to resolve
disputes peacefully and generate wealth
through legal means.

Peaceful alternatives include free and fair
elections; respect for minority rights; monopoly of
force by the state coupled with a mentality of
service; rule of law with the capacity to hold the
most powerful accountable; and an enabling
environment for a market-based economy.


Nurture safeguards on the exercise of
power to ensure that the institutional
capacities being developed, especially the
security apparatus and judicial system, do
not again become instruments of
persecution of the opposition, that public
revenue generation and expenditure are
not captured by political-criminal
networks, and that illicit revenue does not
determine who governs.

Essential for this purpose are the capacities to
observe governmental performance (transparency)
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and punish misconduct (accountability). Processes
linked to the state, such as competitive elections
that permit alternation in power, an autonomous
judiciary, and independent oversight mechanisms
for the security sector, are necessary but not
sufficient. A vibrant civil society is also required,
including a free press; non-governmental
organizations dedicated to exposing corruption
and shielding whistle blowers; and an independent
intellectual community.
The conflict transformation strategy implemented
by UNMIK and KFOR has largely been a success
but with a caveat. KLA extremists indeed ceased
the use of violence against the Serb community,
their domestic political opponents, and
neighboring states with contiguous Albanian
populations.31 The April 19, 2013 normalization
agreement with Serbia effectively guarantees that
remaining issues in the relationship will be
resolved through peaceful processes. The
international political and security strategies,
therefore, can be acclaimed as resounding
successes.
The caveat, however, is that the strategies to curb
the impunity of former KLA leaders and prevent
capture of the state by those bent on exploiting it
for political and personal gain are seriously
lacking. As a 2011 Clingendael report sums up,
“The current dynamics of governance in Kosovo
point to a concentration of power in the hands of
the ruling PDK and its supporters, who are
accused of links to networks of corruption and
other criminal activities.”32
LESSONS FOR VIOLENT CPS WITH
NEGOTIABLE INTERESTS
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Conflict transformation is an effective
way to deal with violent opponents of
the peace process who have
negotiable interests.

With the exception of a brief incident in Kumanovo,
Macedonia in May 2015.
32
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Conflict transformation entails shaping the peace
implementation context by dealing assertively
with violent spoilers while providing more
attractive peaceful alternatives for pursuit of
wealth and power. KFOR provided essential
military support to UNMIK, which eventually
fielded the capabilities needed to complete the
“intelligence-to-incarceration” continuum and
confront the KLA’s violent obstructionism
through the legal system.
Both the Kosovo and Iraq cases (the latter
involving Jaish al-Mahdi) achieved a high degree
of success by imposing dissuasive costs for the
use of violence in tandem with providing the
opportunity to compete for power peacefully in
the electoral process.33 The final component of a
conflict transformation strategy, establishing
safeguards on the performance of core institutions
(e.g., the security sector, legal system, revenue
generation and expenditure, electoral process) was
the weakest link in both Kosovo and Iraq.


Addressing the sources of illicit revenue
should be a principal way of confronting a
violent CPS with negotiable interests.

All three cases examined in this project failed to
make this a priority initially—to the detriment of
the peace or stabilization process. In Kosovo, after
failing to prevent the KLA from asserting control
over publicly owned enterprises that constituted
one-third of Kosovo’s economy, UNMIK
belatedly mounted a concerted effort to establish
accountable corporate governance structures. The
lack of any mandate for the UN missions in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to
confront the looting of the eastern DRC’s
resources explains the persistence of that conflict
after nearly two decades.34 The lesson that should
be etched indelibly into future planning is that a
flourishing illicit political economy should be
recognized as a primary threat to stabilization.
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Turning ownership of the legal system
over to domestic judges is a
counterproductive way to deal with CPS
who are violent obstructionists.

UNMK had to reverse its decision to place the
legal system in the hands of Kosovar judges
because it resulted in impunity for KLA
extremists engaged in ethnic cleansing against
Serbs and assassinating their Kosovo Albanian
political rivals.


Capacity building should be accompanied
by strategies to combat capture by CPS.

One of the principles that should be borrowed
from the development community is “Do no
harm.” In an environment where CPS are present
and vast sums of assistance are being expended,
there is a real possibility that a substantial
percentage will flow into the wrong hands. One
essential remedy is to immediately emphasize
standing up transparency and accountability
mechanisms for the local institutions under
development. This is especially vital for the
security forces and intelligence apparatus since
they are liable to be subjected to pressure for both
politicization and criminalization.
SUPPORTERS OF THE PEACE PROCESS:
AFGHANISTAN’S CRIMINAL
PATRONAGE NETWORKS
Case study authors Carl Forsberg and Tim
Sullivan cite a description of the criminal
patronage networks (CPN) permeating the Afghan
government by Hamid Karzai’s National Security
Advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta in 2010 that
“begin with the financial banking system, with
corruption networks, with reconstruction and
security firms and also with drugs and the
Taliban; they are in Parliament and they are in
government.”35 As the authors make clear, there
was nothing traditional about Afghanistan’s
criminal patronage networks.
The origins can be traced to mujahedeen
resistance to the Soviet intervention from 1979-89.
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What began as a multi-ethnic opposition
movement became polarized into competing
ethnic camps in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal.
The rivalry between the largely Pashtun Hezb-e
Islami and the Tajik Jamiat-e Islami precipitated
Afghanistan’s 1992-1996 civil war. The
consequence was the emergence of the Taliban
and their dominance of most of Afghanistan after
1996, until the US responded to the 9/11 attacks
that emanated from Afghan soil.
The ensuing 2001 Bonn Conference, which serves
in this case as the functional equivalent of a peace
agreement, perversely became a prescription for
criminalization of the state. In the estimation of
the authors, “Corruption in Afghanistan reached
crippling levels as a result of the character of the
county’s post-2001 political settlement, which
was built on the distribution of political power
between factions formed during the country’s civil
war.”36
One of the outcomes of Bonn was to concede the
defense and interior ministries to the Tajik party
under Mohammad Fahim, which, the authors note,
was a result of having occupied Kabul with his
militias. Thus Karzai, who was designated as
interim president by the Bonn Conference, was
dealt a very weak hand. The only trump card that
he might have played—U.S. support for
constraining Fahim—was not forthcoming. Indeed,
the Bush administration encouraged
accommodation with Afghanistan’s regional
potentates.
As a result, there were no consequences for
wholesale abuse of power and looting of state
resources, which soon included siphoning off
customs revenue, misappropriating international
assistance, protecting heroin traffickers, and
exploiting financial institutions for personal gain.
Emblematic of the kleptocratic political economy
that resulted was the collapse of Kabul Bank in
2010, which required a bailout equating to more
than 5% of the country’s GNP. According to
Forsberg and Sullivan, “Under the influence of the
Fahim family, Afghanistan's largest bank had, in
36
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essence, become an instrument of patronage
employed by the ruling elites.”37
In a speech in 2002 Karzai effectively conferred
impunity on CPN stating, “Justice becomes a
luxury for now.”38 Even after winning election as
President in 2004 and again in 2009, however,
Karzai continued “a strategy of balancing,
dividing, and co-opting—rather than
confronting—Afghanistan’s fractious strongmen
and their clients.”39 Rather than being a temporary
expedient, impunity for members of Karzai’s CPN
coalition was central to the illicit political
economy upon which his regime was founded.
The United States neglected the menace posed by
Afghanistan’s CPN for years. Indeed, the authors
note, “U.S. policy often exacerbated the problem
by using regional strongmen and their CPNs as
proxies in operations against al-Qaeda and
Taliban fighters.”40 In 2003, when internecine
violence among competing regional militia
commanders posed a threat to stability, the United
States adopted a “warlord strategy” involving
coercive measures to compel disarmament of
militias combined with co-optation of
commanders into the central government.
Rather than diminishing the CPN threat, however,
this strategy merely traded off a noninstitutionalized renunciation of violence among
themselves by these warlords for an expansion of
the number of CPN divvying up governmental
largesse. Demobilization of militia forces often
resulted in rebranding their followers as police,
endowing them with the legitimacy of the state to
engage in predatory and criminal practices. In the
assessment of Forsberg and Sullivan, “Violent
conflict between armed militias and overt
factionalism was sublimated into competition for
state office, patronage, and wealth. Although
intimidation remained omnipresent in both the
public and private sectors, money replaced guns
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as the leading source of political influence.”41 The
consequence was to divert the focus of
government away from responding to the needs of
the population, thereby sapping it of legitimacy
and public support against the Taliban insurgency.
The authors call attention to “the connection
between the Taliban’s reemergence after 2003 and
the abuse of power by government officials,
security forces, and their networks of affiliates.”42
The strategy undertaken by the international
community starting in 2002 focused primarily on
capacity-building. This included massive
resources allocated to the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), comprised of both the
army and police. This strategy foundered,
however, because “technical assistance and
capacity-building alone, absent measures to
counter the influence of CPN, could do little to
prevent the growing dysfunction of Afghanistan’s
state institutions.”43
To confront the crippling impact of CPN required
depriving them of impunity, but this did not
become a focus for U.S. policy until 2007. At first
this “prosecutorial approach” relied upon the
Afghan Attorney General’s office, with the result
that the principal targets for prosecution were
Karzai’s own political rivals and media critics.
The U.S. coordinator for this initiative, Thomas
Schweich, resigned in 2008, publishing an article
that characterized Afghanistan as a narco-state in
which the Karzai government protected a class of
criminal elites.44
In 2009 a new entity for prosecution of political
criminals, the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF),
was launched under the tutelage of the FBI with
the intention of shielding it from political
interference. After some initial successes,
however, this initiative was neutralized by Karzai
after the MCTF arrested Amad Zia Salehi, “a key
palace insider who moved money to facilitate
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Karzai’s political agenda and was on the payroll
of the CIA.”45
In 2010, the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) designated CPN as a
strategic threat and sought to counter them by
creating a task force that stressed accountability as
an essential component of Afghan security force
development. ISAF fostered this through creation
of oversight mechanisms to investigate and
sanction criminal misconduct. Among the most
effective countermeasures were international
intelligence sharing and coordinated action by
international law enforcement against key CPN
members. International financial sanctions were
another mechanism used. The authors conclude
that such international action “became a critical
way to degrade Afghanistan’s criminal networks,
creating a deterrent effect that the Afghan judicial
system was incapable of achieving.”46
In evaluating the effectiveness of an international
strategy, we begin by considering what type of
CPS was present when the international
community intervened. In Afghanistan, unless we
count the Taliban, there was no legacy of CPS
governance. The Afghan experience provides a
surefire formula for failure: overlook the prospect
that CPS are capable of emerging in the presence
of a power vacuum, then wait for years to
confront impunity until CPS have entrenched
themselves in power because they are regarded as
supporters.
To succeed, the international community must
come prepared to create dissuasive consequences
for CPS exploiting their capacity for intimidation
to capture state functions. This requires the means
to promptly monitor and constrict illicit financial
flows, impose costs such as international law
enforcement actions, and establish mechanisms
for transparency and accountability.
Prospects for change exist in Afghanistan owing
to the election of reformer Ashraf Ghani as
president, but patronage networks are deeply
embedded. Lacking in Afghanistan are durable
institutions to mediate the contest for wealth and
45
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power, governmental legitimacy, and popular
support that are essential to prevail over the
Taliban.
Even though Karzai and various warlords either
supported or were co-opted into supporting the
Bonn Settlement, their criminal patronage
networks became a ruinous barrier to stabilization
against a Taliban insurgency that could more
credibly claim to offer justice and an end to
impunity. In sum, in spite of the recent emergence
of hope for progress, the strategy implemented in
Afghanistan until 2016 when this case was
assessed can only be categorized as a failure
because it ushered in the criminal patronage
network phenomenon that delegitimized the
government and severely encumbered the
campaign against the Taliban.
LESSONS FOR CPS THAT SUPPORT THE
PEACE PROCESS




Our Colombia case attributes the success attained
there against the hidden, symbiotic relationship
between the paramilitaries and the Uribe
government primarily to the Colombian media
that exposed government complicity in
paramilitary crimes as well as the legal system
and electoral process that held officials
responsible.48 These are not common attributes,
however, of most political systems that are
struggling to emerge from conflict.
Failures in Afghanistan and Iraq can be attributed
to the inability of international peace and
stabilization missions to hold the Maliki and
Karzai governments accountable for the
debilitating consequences of corruption on
corroding state capacity and legitimacy. This
strongly indicates that the international
community should place its emphasis on
developing accountability mechanisms when
confronted with a spoiler that is also a supporter
of the peace process.

CPS that are supporters of the peace
process have produced the worst
outcomes.

The criminal patronage networks that were
spawned under the Karzai administration drained
it of legitimacy thereby vitiating international
efforts to defeat the Taliban. As had been the case
in Bosnia and Haiti, for years in Afghanistan the
military dismissed the CPS threat as a distraction
from their mission. The strategy implemented to
deal with the Nouri al-Maliki regime in Iraq also
failed spectacularly. In addition to governing in a
sectarian manner that alienated the Sunni
population, Maliki’s pervasive network of
patronage hollowed out the combat capability of
the Iraqi Army to such an extent that it collapsed
in the face of an offensive by the Islamic State in
June 2014. 47
The most effective antidote for a spoiler
in disguise that supports the peace process
is functioning institutions of transparency
and accountability.

CONCLUSIONS
The overall success rate for the ten cases
treated in Criminalized Power Structures: The
Overlooked Enemies of Peace is summarized
below (Table I). This is not a statement about the
success of the overall intervention but an
assessment of whether spoiling activity by the
party to the peace agreement examined in the case
study was effectively reduced or ended.
Surprisingly the highest rate of success has been
achieved in dealing with irreconcilables; however,
this has only resulted after the missions were either
brought to the brink of calamity by failure to
recognize the CPS menace (Bosnia, Haiti, and
Sierra Leone) or the threat was allowed to
metathesize into a nearly intractable challenge
(Guatemala). Our second category, violent
opponents with negotiable interests, produced a
mixture of success and partial success, but this
came only after lengthy and costly delays. The
record in dealing with supporters of the peace
process has been the least successful, with two
failures: Iraq-Maliki and Afghanistan. The success
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in Colombia, moreover, was attributable not to the
international strategy but rather to the prevailing
strength of the indigenous media and court system
that exposed and effectively confronted the CPS
network that had infiltrated the government. All of
this reinforces the point that the international
community has suffered from a persistent blind spot
to the potential for CPS to pose a severe spoiler
threat.
This abbreviated review of the empirical record
summarizes the data we collected as we sought to
advance Stedman’s quest for a typological theory of
spoiler management.49 Below, the ends, ways, and
means employed by the successful strategies are
summarized.
Ends
Whenever spoilers are present, whether CPS or
any other manifestation, the mission should
include among its primary aims to minimize or
eliminate the threat they pose to the peace or
stabilization process. For CPS, however, the
emphasis should be on curbing their spoiling
behavior and not on seeking to stifle unrelated
organized crime or corruption.
Ways


Thus coercive diplomacy is appropriate for both
types of CPS until irreconcilables make it
manifest that negotiation is futile. To persuade
CPS with negotiable interests that there are more
attractive peaceful alternatives than exploitation
of violence and criminally derived wealth to attain
power also requires development of institutions
that can sustain the rule of law; respect for human
rights and minority rights; free and open elections;
and an enabling environment for a free market
economy.
At the other end of the spectrum, for CPS that
support the peace process, coercive force is
inappropriate. Nevertheless, dissuasive
consequences must be created for seeking to
capture and exploit the state for personal or
political gain. This requires development of
institutions capable of providing transparency and
accountability, including the rule of law and
honest elections.


Strategies should be tailored to the
different types of CPS.

Our case studies confirm Stedman’s assertion that
there is “a range of strategies to deal with spoilers,
from ones that rely heavily on conciliation to ones
that depend greatly on the use of coercion...”50
Strategies must be tailored, therefore, to the
degree and type of recalcitrance manifested by the
CPS.
Irreconcilables are not amenable to conciliation
and must be dismantled or defeated. Coercion is
also an essential component of a strategy for
combatting violent CPS with negotiable interests.
The purpose for the use of force, however, is
different. It is to raise the costs of using violence
49

to unacceptable levels. Since it is difficult to
discern whether interests are reconcilable or not
(especially in the wake of a peace agreement), it is
prudent to combine any use of force in the face of
episodes of violence with renewed overtures for a
diplomatic resolution.
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Conflict transformation is an appropriate
way to combat all types of CPS.

The strategies used in most successful cases
(Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Iraq--JAM, and
Colombia) aligned with the three mutually
reinforcing lines of effort involved in conflict
transformation.51 While all three lines of effort
complement each other and should be used in
tandem, the emphasis given to each should be
tailored to the type of CPS engaged in spoiling
behavior. The variation in emphasis that should be
given to the three lines of effort involved in
conflict transformation is specified below:
-

Shape the environment by addressing the
drivers of conflict.

This line of action will be most essential and
decisive with irreconcilables (e.g., Bosnia, Sierra
51
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Leone, and Haiti). Dissuasive consequences must
be established for use of violence. To deal with
irreconcilables as well as violent opponents, the
mission must have the military proficiency to
protect civilians, the mission, and the mandate;
however, the most sustainable way to accomplish
this is through intelligence-led operations, which
result in evidence that can be used in legal
proceedings that are autonomous from the
influence of CPS.
Exploitation of illicit revenue to capture power is
also a driver of conflict. Since all CPS are
characterized by this, all missions confronted by a
CPS spoiler threat should have the ability to track
illicit revenue streams, both internal and
international, and shut them down.
-

Institutionalize more attractive peaceful
alternatives for pursuit of wealth and
power.

This component of the strategy is at the heart of
transforming violent opponents into peaceful
supporters of the peace process. Legitimate
institutions to mediate the competition for wealth
and power need to be nurtured by the international
community in order to sustain the peace process
after the CPS threat has been diminished.
The most challenging aspect is ending impunity
when CPS have insinuated themselves into the
apparatus of government. To do this, a more
sophisticated approach than merely building
domestic capacity and then turning ownership
over is required. To stabilize these situations, it is
vital for the international community to play a
more direct role in buttressing the prevailing legal
system in order to render CPS vulnerable to
criminal prosecution and incarceration before
transitioning to indigenous ownership (e.g.,
Kosovo).
-

Develop safeguards on the performance
of institutional capacity that is being
developed to prevent state capture and
future abuse of power.

This is the most effective way to prevent
supporters of the peace process from emerging as
dangerous spoilers. Safeguards provide

40

transparency and accountability and serve as a
barrier against capture of the state by criminalized
elites. They must be developed in the structures of
government and civil society to provide an
effective check on abuse of power.
The State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations has adopted conflict
transformation as their paradigm for strategic
planning, so this research provides empirical
evidence that their strategy has the versatility to
cope with the full spectrum of spoiler threats.
Means52


Assess whether CPS are a threat and, if
so, determine the type involved53

As Stedman observed, “(T)he choice of an
appropriate strategy requires the correct diagnosis
of the type of spoiler.”54 Just as vital is to avoid
overlooking the CPS threat in the first place and
exposing the mission to risk of failure and years
of incompetence.


Track the revenue streams sustaining CPS
and shut them down55

All types of CPS rely on illicit revenue to secure
and maintain power. To undercut this threat,
expertise is needed to monitor illicit money flows;
investigate grand corruption and theft of
international assistance; prosecute those
responsible; and seize ill-gotten gains.


When the domestic legal system has been
suborned by CPS, the international
community will need to play an active
role in establishing rule of law.56

The international community must take the
initiative to confront these enemies of peace.
Essential capabilities include collection of
52
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criminal intelligence; high-risk arrest; and
international judges and prosecutors to adjudicate
crimes against the mandate through the use of
hybrid justice institutions.


Develop effective mechanisms for
transparency and accountability.57

For peace to be sustainable and to avoid
politicization or criminalization of the capacities
developed by the international community,
especially the security sector and intelligence
apparatus, equal priority should be given to
development of transparency and accountability.
The most essential institutions are a free press; an
independent judiciary; a mobilized civil society;
and an electoral process conducive to alternation
in power.
One purpose of this article has been to present
evidence that CPS are the predominant spoiler
threat to peace implementation. The ten case
studies detailed in Criminalized Power
Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace,
three of which are summarized above, provide
extensive documentation to substantiate this.
Overlooking this spoiler threat has brought
several of the missions examined by this project
to the brink of collapse, and by arriving
unprepared to deal with this recurrent threat,
peace and stabilization missions have
squandered the golden hour. In the ten cases we
examined, the average delay in obtaining
authorization for essential authorities and
capabilities was almost five years.
Another key finding of this work is that
criminalized power structures come in three discrete
forms: irreconcilables, violent opponents with
negotiable interests, and supporters of the peace
process. Owing to the variation in types of CPS,
strategies must be designed to confront their
spoiling behavior in an appropriate manner. The
strategies used in the most successful cases (Bosnia,
Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Iraq – JAM, and Colombia)
aligned with the three mutually reinforcing lines of
effort involved in conflict transformation.
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Perhaps the most troubling consequence of the
propensity to overlook criminalized power
structures is that they may not only spoil peace
processes and stability operations; they may also
spoil international willingness to support the very
enterprise of peace implementation. The ultimate
goal of this work is to improve upon the success
rate of interventions by asking the right questions
before intervening so the risks posed by
criminalized power structures are recognized prior
to deployment. This will allow international peace
missions to be endowed with authorities and
resources required to succeed and to be guided by
strategies appropriate for the type of CPS
involved.
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TABLE 1: Assessment of Success by Type of Criminalized Power Structure (CPS)

Irreconcilable CPS
Case
Bosnia
Sierra Leone
Haiti
Guatemala

CPS
Third Entity Movement
RUF
Gangs of Cité Soleil
CIACS

Outcome
Success (after risking failure)
Success (after risking failure)
Partial success (after risking failure)
Partial success (after risks were
exacerbated)

Violent Opponents with Negotiable Interests
Case
Kosovo
Iraq
DRC

CPS
Kosovo Liberation Army
Jaish al-Mahdi
M-23

Outcome
Success, with qualifications
Success, with qualifications
Partial success

Supporters of the Peace Process
Case
Colombia
Afghanistan
Iraq

CPS
Paramilitaries
Criminal Patronage Networks
Nouri al-Maliki

Outcome
Success
Failure
Failure
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Cadet Voice
Hypersonic Weapons’ Effect on Strategic Stability
Darren Sency
Initial exploration of the relationship between new technologies and strategic stability finds that
hypersonic weapons, regardless of which power deploys them, first, could raise the probability of nuclear
war.
The United States Air Force’s high
speed/hypersonic integration and demonstration
line of budgeting nearly tripled for fiscal year
2017. The $92.8 million displays intensifying
interest in the realm of hypersonic research.1
Without providing details, the level of classified
work being done in developing this technology
has been said to be “far more extensive.”2 The era
of hypersonic weapons is underway. With the
introduction of new military technology, the
effects on the methods by which future wars are
fought and the political arena which will frame
these conflicts should be considered. The
strategist Colin Gray offers, “All military
behavior is tactical in execution, but must have
operational and strategic effect, intended and
otherwise.”3 The purpose of this paper is to
suggest that the capabilities presented by
hypersonic weapons are inherently destabilizing at
the strategic level.
During testimony to the United States Congress in
December 2015, leading policy expert James M.
Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace opened by stating, “Let me
emphasize from the start that I am genuinely
undecided about whether the United States should
acquire CPGS (Conventional Prompt Global
Strike) weapons. The capability would
unquestionably convey potential benefits, but it
would also carry potential risks. Today, in my
opinion, the relative magnitudes of those benefits
and risks are unclear.”4 It is important to note at
the onset that this study aimed neither to find an
answer to that question nor form any opinion on
1
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the issue. The aim has been and remains to
objectively weigh capabilities presented by this
technology and assess the strategic implications.
A level of difficulty exists in assessing weapons
capability of a developing technology. Open
source information leaves something to be desired
in that it can be outdated or fails to reflect what a
fielded weapons system may eventually look like.
The desire to determine the effects of specific
capabilities while remaining broad about what
said capabilities look like on paper proved
challenging.
For this reason, it is important to outline the
parameters of this discussion. The definition of
strategic stability that will be referenced will be
from scholar Elbridge Colby.5 He counts as stable
any scenario providing “no incentives for nuclear
use save for vindication of vital interests.” While
there are a variety of systems being researched,
hypersonic weapons will be broadly defined as
any weapon travelling in excess of Mach 5—to
exclude intercontinental ballistic missiles. Finally,
the effects of these weapons systems on strategic
stability will be viewed in a generic sense on the
state level from no parochial perspective—
statements from different state perspectives will
be utilized to frame the strategic environment and
hypersonic weapons’ potential effects.
STRATEGIC STABILITY
The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review
uses the words “stable,” “stability,” and
5
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“instability” forty-nine times in the main text, but
governments around the world aspire to achieve
“strategic stability”—an end which is as easily
defined as it is attained.6 Certain forces, certain
force employment postures, and certain kinds of
negotiated agreements could be the means by
which this goal is attained. The abovementioned
definition that we will focus on, again, is “no
incentives for nuclear use save for vindication of
vital interests.”7 This definition reflects the
intellectual marriage between strategic thought
and nuclear weapons—the domain which
hypersonic weapons will affect, intentionally or
not.

argues that compared to the Cold War bilateral
dynamic, the world is complicated by, his term,
“security trilemmas”—a traditional security
dilemma in which there are unintentional tertiary
effects.

Gregory Koblentz’s Strategic Stability in the
Second Nuclear Age outlines myriad reasons why
the strategic environment is less certain now than
it was during the Cold War. The same
psychological imperatives that existed during the
Cold War prevail in a less certain, more complex
strategic environment involving new dynamics
and technologies.

While the immediate threat of major power,
nuclear war is not of immediate concern, the
playing field is more crowded and less certain,
and strategic theory has not kept pace. The
strategic environment demands attention to
various capabilities, which all provide “different
levels of utility for deterrence, war-fighting,
coercion, and assurance.”12

Fifty-five years ago, Thomas Schelling and
Morton Halperin defined strategic nuclear
stability in a bilateral standoff between the Soviet
Union and the United States as requiring
reduction in incentives for preemptive strike.
They added that strategic stability should be
“reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and
perturbations.”8 Since the fall of the USSR, it had
seemed unlikely that great power conflict would
erupt along the lines premised by
Schelling/Halperin. “As the memories of the
terrors of the world wars and the nuclear fears of
the Cold War fade,” the legacy of the strategic
nuclear environment persists, certainly in the USRussian relationship but also in the relations of all
nuclear powers.9

The ability to deter, to coerce, or to assure all
depend upon one’s ability to effectively
communicate. The lack of balance presented by
the states with strategic—nuclear and otherwise—
capabilities complicates the ability of any to
effectively communicate. Over seventy years of
cold war rivalry, a relationship gradually
developed between the USSR and USA, but
today’s environment provides no such
relationships between strategic partners, save the
enduring US-Russian legacy.

As Koblentz notes, today’s strategic environment
is characterized by an “explosive mixture of
unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border
terrorism, and growing nuclear arsenals.”10 He
6
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Contrary to what is true in the physical
world, where three points provide more
stability than two, in the international
arena, triangles may make a situation
more unstable and difficult to control
(escalation dominance) as they introduce
more variables into the algebra of
deterrence.11

At the same time, there remains a common and
necessary thread of vagueness surrounding the
policies of nuclear states. The US, Britain, and
France all have limiting but nonbinding
descriptions as to when they would resort to
nuclear force if at all. Russia, for example,
“reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in
response to the use of nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction against Russia and/or its
allies…[and in conventional war] when the very
existence of the State is under threat.”13

7
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In efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear use, the
United States, and other powerful adversaries, are
pursuing “non-nuclear precision-guided
weapons…for striking critical, time-sensitive
targets…[creating] new risks to strategic stability
and [making] other states less willing to reduce
their own reliance on nuclear weapons.”14 In
regards to strategic weapons, it is the capability
rather than the intent of a system that matters for
national security policy makers.
In the modern strategic environment, even a
bilateral relationship in pursuit of strategic
stability is complicated:
The essential idea of strategic stability is
that if both sides field forces that are
capable of surviving a first strike and can
credibly demonstrate to one another that
their current and future capabilities cannot
deny the other side a viable strategic
deterrent, this confidence would eliminate
the fear of preemption and the need to
launch weapons early, either as irritants in
a crisis or as dangers in conflict. This
would reduce the danger that nuclear war
might begin because of essentially
technical “use or lose” or “itchy triggerfinger” fears—concerns that can become
very real in crises and conflicts. 15
Confusion, ambiguity, and pressure are the
nemesis of strategic stability. Repercussions of
these qualities are a function in part of
fundamental aspects of deterrence thought that
grew out of the Cold War. Certain modes of
thought developed in those years still apply in the
current environment. A brief discussion of these
principles is thus essential in determining the
potential destabilizing effects of hypersonic
weapons.

precarious by nature.16 Deterrence calculations are
made in the context of the strategic environment
and the perceived threat from adversaries. At the
root of formulating offensive and defensive
security measures, as Admiral Richard Mies
notes, “Nations don’t distrust each other because
they are armed; they are armed because they
distrust each other.”17
In 2016, policy support for tactical and
operational employment of strategic systems
seems to mirror Spurgeon Keeny’s mapping from
the 1980s: those attempting to deter a wider range
of actions and “those who are simply trying to
carry out their military responsibilities in a more
"rational" or cost-effective manner.”18 The
patterns learned in the Cold War still provide
lessons for the modern day.
The first principle of importance to note is the fact
that, “requirements of deterrence are not static.
Rather, technology provides a dynamic variable
which affects both the deterrer and the state to be
deterred.”19 This reality is enduring. Policy
makers still have to consider the strategic
implications of new weaponry.
This dynamic was foretold in writings from the
Cold War. “This situation is not peculiar to
present force structures or technologies; and,
regardless of future technical developments, it
will persist as long as substantial nuclear weapon
stockpiles remain.”20 While this new wrinkle—
hypersonic weapons—is not necessarily a nuclear
weapon issue, the existence of nuclear stockpiles
by countries pursuing these technologies
necessitates the consideration of these theories.
Perhaps the most telling statement explaining this
dynamic is as follows:
Over time, aided by technological
advancements in targeting accuracy,
new delivery means, and improved
command and control mechanisms,

DETERRENCE THEORY
Nuclear deterrence depends upon
psychological elements of calculation for which
there are no physical proofs, and it is therefore

16
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competing notions of deterrence have
evolved which are more traditional in
their roots… deterrence by
denial…emphasizes the traditional
objective of military defense threatening
to deny the attacker success in the
achievement of military and political
objectives, thereby deterring an attempt
that would be not only costly but, more
to the point, unsuccessful.21
A stable dynamic, then, would be one in which
neither side saw an incentive to strike first.
The advent of an offensive weapon system that
could disarm the adversary preemptively is
incredibly destabilizing. “If either side feels that
it could be deprived of a retaliatory capability,
then there is a powerful incentive for both sides
to strike first.”22
The duality of the offensive/defensive nature of
nuclear weapons is made more complex in that
any use would be “physically indistinguishable
from weapons which are designed for a disarming
first strike.”23 The new capabilities and resulting
considerations coming from the development of
hypersonic weapons requires a deeper
understanding of the technology itself.
HYPERSONICS
The deterrent value of hypersonic
weapons is summarized by former Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy Peter C.W. Flory in the following manner:
In this new and uncertain environment, a
“one size fits all” approach to deterrence
is no longer appropriate; we must re-think
our approach to 21st Century threats and
tailor deterrence to assure our allies and
friends, and achieve specific effects
against a wide array of potential
adversaries and circumstances, such as
advanced military competitors, regional
WMD states, and non-state terrorist
networks. To do this we must have a

broad range of credible strategic
capabilities—including nuclear and nonnuclear Global Strike capabilities,
defenses, and a revitalized . . .
infrastructure.24
There is a value at the strategic level provided by
hypersonic weapons. They could provide policy
makers with an added dimension of options in a
crisis or conflict. From a US perspective there
exist “important political and strategic advantages
… in being able to strike high-value targets
having time-sensitive urgency that could not be
effectively engaged by currently available
conventional strike systems.”25
As mentioned before, a great deal of strategic and
deterrence thinking comes from the domain of
nuclear weapons and policy. For example, a 2014
RAND report on hypersonic technology suggested
that hypersonics could be fitted to become a new
type of unstoppable nuclear weapon. 26 Interesting,
though, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering Stephen Welby said,
“There’s nothing in the budget” related to
modeling, researching, or exploring nucleararmed hypersonics by the United States.27
The United States Air Force does have a longterm plan for the development of hypersonic
technology. The timeframe suggests that a
“tactical strike missile” would be the first
operational military asset, ready around year
2020. Future plans include an intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platform
around 2030, and the USAF aspires to produce a
“reusable and persistent ISR and strike craft by
2040. 28
These systems represent the emerging hypersonic
cruise missile variety of weapon. However, two
primary categories emerge within the literature:
hypersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic
maneuvering reentry vehicles. The latter category
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—commonly referred to as boost glide reentry—is
the primary focus of concern for this study.

“[shrinking] the ‘time to target’ window” creates a
problem in the strategic nuclear domain.

The development process for this technology will
likely mirror that for all nations pursuing these
capabilities. The technology’s effect on strategic
stability will likely center on its strike role—i.e., a
boost glide weapon launched via ballistic missile.
Existing infrastructure for launching a boost-glide
weapon would suggest this would also be the first
capability to become operational. Potential effects
on strategic stability are therefore most easily
framed via boost glide reentry vehicles, although
some effects may be true for the cruise missile
variety as well.

“Fourth dimension” effects of “[getting] inside an
adversary’s command, control, and battle
management cycle” are also a tremendous asset at
the operational and tactical level. 30

In assessing possible upsides for the weapon
system, a January 2016 Mitchell Institute for
Aerospace Studies report offered the following:

However, regarding escalation control and
incentives to strike first, the same capability
becomes dangerous. By forcing an adversary’s
decision making process, a rushed choice could
lead to mistakes or misinterpretations. This is not
desirable at the strategic level. An adversary
fearing the destruction of its strategic weapons
could feel the need to employ those weapons
preemptively. “‘Strategic’ does not just mean
nuclear.”32

Hypersonic weapons offer advantage in
four broad areas for US combat forces.
They can project striking power at range
without falling victim to increasingly
sophisticated defenses; they compress the
shooter-to-target window, and open new
engagement opportunities; they rise to the
challenge of addressing numerous types
of strikes; and they enhance future joint
and combined operations. Within each of
these themes are other advantages which,
taken together, redefine military power
projection in the face of an increasingly
unstable and dangerous world.29

The speed of a hypersonic weapon greatly
compresses the so-called “find, fix, track,
target, engage, and assess” (F2T2EA)
process, enabling US commanders the
ability to penetrate an opponent’s decision
making process, and as a result, rapidly
put an adversary on the defensive.31

Hypersonic weapons provide unprecedented
promptness and global reach. “A theater-ranging
hypersonic missile will reach a target 1,000 miles
distant within 17 minutes or less.33 The range of
these weapons compounded with accuracy creates
further pressure on decision makers in a crisis to
feel as though their interests are held at immediate
risk.

CAPABILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES
Hypersonic weapons could effectively
prosecute command, control, and
communications (C3) points, key
leadership, and key ground, naval, and
maritime targets. Hypersonic strike
weapons could more effectively engage
high value targets…The speed and reach
of hypersonic strike could preempt the
launch of a theater ballistic missile.
Hypersonic weaponry could also address

Operational and tactical competencies
provided and enhanced by hypersonic strike
systems alone—future developments
notwithstanding—are indeed impressive, exciting,
and arguably necessary in a modern war scenario.
Nevertheless, utilizing these weapons carries risks
for those considering the strategic nuclear aspects
of warfare.
The speed at which hypersonic weapons travel
could have negative strategic effects in terms of
stability. The operational and tactical asset of
29
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the challenge of hardened and buried
targets.34
In the context of a nuclear crisis or the mindset of
a strategic adversary, these aforementioned
capabilities are themselves a forcing function for
fearful, mistake-prone, and escalatory reactions.
The mere perception of a capability regardless of
intent is potentially destabilizing at the strategic
level.
The payload along with the kinetic ability of the
weapon system is also concerning at the strategic
level. A hypersonic weapon could be nuclear
armed or provide combat effects like an anti-ship
ballistic missile (ASBM).35 The capability to
strike at hypersonic speed creates devastating
effects: when dropped on one’s foot, a bowling
ball inflicts a great deal of pain; the effect of a
conventional payload, though, is amplified greatly
once the “bowling ball” is shot from a cannon.
Concerns about nuclear ambiguity have been at
the forefront of hypersonic debate in the United
States since “2006, when President George W.
Bush’s administration first announced plans to
replace the nuclear warheads on some Trident II
D5 ballistic missiles with conventional
weapons.”36 Inability to distinguish launch of a
conventional versus nuclear missile resulted in
Congress halting the program. Hypersonic
weapons might also be indistinguishable between
nuclear and non-nuclear variants—especially
when launched from great distances. The strategic
effects of conventional hypersonic weapons in any
case complicate the analysis, which favors the
argument that instability after deployment by any
state party would increase.
One solution to the warhead ambiguity issue was
the suggestion that a state could observe the flight
path of a weapon and determine that non-ballistic
reentries were non-nuclear. This is complicated
for a number of reasons, the first of which being
that there may be no reason to assume nonballistic, boost-glide trajectories carry only
conventional weapons. Further, given the current
34
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technology, “[the state] would see the launch of a
weapon that would quickly disappear from view,
and the remainder of the flight path would be
untraceable given current technology.”37 Another
mitigating factor offered by the Air Force would
be segregation. Ballistic missiles containing
conventional, boost glide reentry vehicles would
be positioned far and apart from the nuclear
arsenal. “Two potential bases included
Vandenberg Air Force Base on the West Coast
and Cape Canaveral on the East Coast. 38
Maneuverability of reentry vehicles is a doubleedged sword. Boost-glide reentry vehicles could
allow a hypersonic weapon “to avoid flight over
third party nations when approaching the target.”39
This same quality would permit the weapon after
launch to “radically change its trajectory to avoid
missile defenses.”40 These tactical advantages are
sometimes referred to as destination ambiguity,
which, unfortunately, at the strategic level “could
potentially lead a different adversary to conclude
that they were under attack, risking inadvertent
escalation. (The risk would be even greater if the
observing state also misidentified [a conventional]
weapon as nuclear armed.)”41
Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works® conception of
a hypersonic weapon advertises “responsive strike
capability on time-critical, heavily defended
targets and…high survivability through altitude,
speed and stealth.”42 Such capability at the tactical
level would overwhelm or evade enemy air
defense systems. Yet, these same systems of the
adversary provide mutual strategic benefit in
terms of psychological reassurance. A single
target, removed by a hypersonic weapon in a
successful tactical strike could have drastically
different, destabilizing consequences at the
strategic level.
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CONCLUSION
Viewed through the lens of a
tactical/operational versus a strategic mindset, the
same set of capabilities can be either encouraging
or terrifying.
Instead of working to establish air
superiority, establish tanker support,
position personnel recovery assets,
establish airborne command and control
networks, prosecute electronic warfare,
and infiltrate attack platforms through
myriad defenses, a hypersonic strike
would unfold far more rapidly, with far
fewer support requirements. Unable to
intercept these high speed weapons, a first
strike wave could simultaneously
eliminate the most heavily defended
enemy nuclear facilities and key targets in
a fraction of the time, at a much lower
threshold of risk to attackers.43
The development of hypersonic weapons
technology is likely to be perceived as an effort to
deny other states their retaliatory nuclear
capability—and achieve a splendid first strike,
one of Schelling and Halperin’s conditions for
strategic instability.44 In fact, nearly every
provocative narrative warned of by Schelling and
Halperin at the start of the Cold War is revisited in
the modern security environment by today’s
nonnuclear strategic weapons, which lie outside
the nuclear “taboo” established gradually after
1945.
While the strategic arena is complex, with new
players and new capabilities, it is important to
recognize that strategic stability and deterrence
principles have the same roots as during the Cold
War and before that in the history of warfare. “To
modify and adapt Clausewitz, nuclear weapons
changed the grammar of deterrence, not its
character.”45

Hypersonic weapons—conventional or nuclear,
ours or theirs—further complicate the equation.
Efforts to ease strategic miscalculation must also
be stressed in coming years as the global security
environment continues to shift.
As Dr. Acton advocates, all parties pursuing
hypersonic weapons should take steps to assess
the full range of escalation risks.46 And as industry
experts state, “Hypersonics technologies and
weapons are both vitally important and
inevitable.”47 This being the case, statesmen,
military professionals, and industry leaders should
consider the strategic implications of serving
tactical and operational targets with hypersonic
weapons.
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Essay

Book Review
The Physics of Wall Street: A Brief History of Predicting the
Unpredictable by James Owen Weatherall
Brian M. Kruchkow
A USAFA graduate comments on predicting the unpredictable when surveying new spaces at the
frontiers of defense policy.
James Owen Weatherall’s book about the
robust interplay of Wall Street and physics is a
captivating romp about select physicists as well as
a lesson on how finance both succeeds and falls
short when it applies mathematical models to
predict economic behavior.1 Such a book is a
surprising candidate for a review in Space and
Defense. Yet the ideas Weatherall presents are
innovative, and they offer a framework for
thinking about the problems with which this
journal is concerned. In fact, The Physics of Wall
Street provides a timely solution to a major
challenge space and defense policy faces in
modeling rare political events.
The Physics of Wall Street is an easy read, for
Weatherall has made his book interesting as both
intellectual history and personal narrative.
Finance and physics are not top reads for most
people, of course, unless they are a practitioner in
either field or they need highly specialized
information. Yet Weatherall’s book appeals to a
wide audience with insightful biographies of
physicists who shaped finance. Each chapter of
the book begins as a story about a notable
physicist, and introduces the mathematical theory
for which that person is known. Weatherall, as an
example, uses anecdotes from the brief life of
Louis Bachelier, intertwined with Bachelier’s
revolutionary idea of how price changes are in
essence a random walk.2 This is the central virtue
1
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2
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of the book; neither physics nor finance ever
becomes dull. Indeed, the mathematical theories
of the physicists become irresistible as the
currency for appreciating their rich life story.
Weatherall adeptly explains complicated
mathematics and financial theories, making these
ideas accessible for anyone curious enough to
open the book. One of the most delightful parts of
The Physics of Wall Street is when Weatherall
cheerfully walks the reader through the discovery
of log-normal distributions (skewed bell curves)
and how this realization affected expectations of
volatility and ultimately prices in the stock
market.3 Greater still is Weatherall’s explanation
of Cauchy-distributions: how a mathematician
named Benoit Mandelbrot proved that the
standard deviation of prices most people thought
of as normal actually needed to incorporate
“extreme” events more frequently than expected,
which Mandelbrot termed as “fattening the tails.”4
The book eases the reader through these concepts
and makes sure to enliven math and financial
terms with stories about how Mandelbrot and
others came to their ideas. In this way Weatherall
transforms two difficult subjects into a pleasant
and edifying journey for any reader.
One area where the book falls short is
Weatherall’s sanguine treatment of the people
about which he writes. Weatherall, of course,
must discuss the merits which make each of his
characters worthy of being in the book; however,
3
4
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Kruchkow / Physics of Wall Street
there also has to be context. The entirety of
Chapter 5, for example, is about Fisher Black, one
of the thinkers who created and profited from the
model we use today to price derivatives. Yet
Weatherall elides the controversy still raging in
economic circles over whether Black was
indirectly responsible for one of the largest
financial collapses in history, which nearly
brought down the entire derivatives market.1
Weatherall’s formula of giving biographical
information of the physicists he chooses makes
for an interesting read, but most of that
information covers only favorable fragments of
the character’s career; it does not present a holistic
view of the physicists’ work or negative social
implications of their respective ideas.
SPACE & DEFENSE DEVOTEES AND THE
PHYSICS OF WALL STREET
The salient reason why this book matters
for Space and Defense is that some of the ideas
shaping contemporary physics and finance are
pertinent to contemporary defense thinking. When
Weatherall covers Mandelbrot, the reader quickly
realizes the monumental shift Mandelbrot the
individual brought to our collective understanding
of the world in which we live.
Essentially Mandelbrot proved our world is much
more volatile and less stable than we choose to
believe, even after we see data definitively
indicating its volatility. Tremendous price
movements, for example, happen much more
frequently than expected, just as extreme events in
general happen more frequently (in the fat tails of
a non-normal distribution). This finding is
sobering to those equipped with a mere bell curve,
attempting to defend not only financial order but a
peaceful and just world order. The Physics of Wall
Street, then, is an introduction to thinking anew
about innovation, risk, and predicting what may
happen in Nature, whether physical, economic, or
social.
Toward the end of his biographies, Weatherall
introduces the reader to a little-celebrated
physicist named Didier Sornette and showcases

Sornette’s groundbreaking theories on logperiodic predictions.2 Weatherall deftly explains
how Sornette’s model predicted the 2008 financial
crisis as a culmination of precursors, relatively
tiny cracks in the system.
With this account, Weatherall offers policy
makers a realistic hope that humanity can predict
catastrophic events, which any policy maker
concerned with national defense in an
international system of states must consider.
Perhaps some extreme events so frequent in
Mandelbrot’s model may be accurately predicted
in a timely manner by Sornette’s approach. If so,
this would raise the bar on what policy makers
may do in mitigating or preventing catastrophic
events from happening in the first place.
Weatherall’s book stands on the thesis that
significant real world events are more predictable
than they appear. This opposes conventional
wisdom for many concerned with space and
defense. Our standard notions hew closer to the
black swan theory popularized in Pentagon circles
by Nassim Taleb.3 Taleb warns that black swan
events will at some point upend the world, and
there is no way to head them off.
While it seems unlikely that all catastrophic
events will ever be predicted accurately,
Weatherall, contra Taleb, urges it is worthwhile to
attempt to model these outcomes and to test
models by investing precious resources Taleb
would hold in reserve. In this sense, Weatheralls’
book gives a refreshing rebuttal against darkness
and paralysis induced by black swans. Defiant to
the end, Weatherall parades real-life example after
example of problem-solvers who did not tarry but
strove mightily until eventually they predicted the
unpredictable.
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